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“UFO”: WHEN THE AMERICAN 
DOCTRINE OF RIPENESS VISITED 
ISRAEL 
Mohammed S. Wattad * 
As part of the gradual preparation for the incorporation of the American ripeness doctrine into 
Israeli law, it has been justified on a number of grounds. A fundamental discussion of the scope 
of the doctrine may be found in three important legal cases, which coined the term “the ripeness 
doctrine, Israel style.” A review of these cases reveals that while there is widespread consensus 
among the Israeli Supreme Court justices regarding the actual adoption of the ripeness doctrine, 
there is disagreement – and even confusion – regarding the manner of its implementation. In 
this article, I would like to present a principled position that opposes the adoption of the 
American ripeness doctrine in Israeli constitutional law. This position rests on four main 
arguments: (1) no methodology whatsoever has been employed to incorporate the American 
ripeness doctrine into Israeli constitutional law; (2) the objectives underlying the ripeness 
doctrine, as presented by the Court, even if worthy and correct in themselves, do not compel the 
incorporation of the American doctrine into Israeli law; (3) the adoption of the ripeness doctrine 
in Israeli law, including its development in terms of scope and application is ambiguous, replete 
with inconsistencies, and creates legal uncertainty; and, (4) it seems that the incorporation of the 
ripeness doctrine into Israeli law is motivated by the judiciary’s desire to avoid conflict with the 
political authorities, principally the legislature, particularly in light of ongoing political threats to 
curtail the Court’s powers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Without undertaking to survey the intricacies of the 
ripeness doctrine it is fair to say that its basic rationale 
is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of 
premature adjudication, from entangling themselves 
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in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, 
and also to protect the agencies from judicial 
interference until an administrative decision has been 
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the 
challenging parties. The problem is best seen in a 
twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the 
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the 
hardship to the parties of withholding court 
consideration.1 
This is the American ripeness doctrine, which examines whether a 
particular constitutional issue is ripe for judicial review prior to a 
piece of legislation actually being implemented by the executive 
branch. This is the doctrine due to be introduced into Israeli 
constitutional law which declares that when a constitutional question 
arises, in the absence of a concrete set of facts, the judicial decision 
on the substantive issues must be delayed to a later time.2 As part of 
the gradual preparation for the incorporation of the ripeness doctrine 
into Israeli law, it has been justified on a number of grounds: first, as 
a tool for regulating the stream of referrals and other matters 
submitted to the Court; second, to meet the need to save judicial time 
and increase efficiency; third, to deal with the possibility that, over 
time, the necessity to decide certain fundamental issues will be 
obviated; and fourth, the desire to increase public confidence in the 
judiciary by confining judicial intervention to cases where the dispute 
is concrete.3 
 
 1 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–149 (1967) . 
 2 HCJ 7190/05 Lobel v. Gov’t of Israel, Nevo Legal Database (2006) 
(opinion of Naor, J.). 
 3 Id.; see also HCJ 3429/11 Alumni Ass’n v. Minister of Fin., Nevo Legal 
Database (2012); HCJ 3803/11 Israel Capital Mkt. Trs.’Ass’n v. State of Israel, 
Nevo Legal Database (2012); AAA 7201/11 Rahmani DA Earthworks v. Airports 
Auth., Nevo Legal Database (2014)) (helping to show that the Court favours the 
concept that its main function is to resolve disputes and not restrain the 
government). 
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A fundamental discussion of the scope of the doctrine may 
be found in three important legal cases,4 heard by expanded panels of 
judges, which coined the term “the ripeness doctrine, Israel style”. 
This term signifies the following process: in the first stage, the Court 
examines whether a concrete set of facts is needed to determine the 
constitutional question itself; upon a positive answer being attained in 
the first stage, the Court will examine, as part of a second stage, 
whether other grounds exist which nonetheless require a judicial 
decision to be made on the constitutional question.5 A review of the 
judgments in these three cases reveals that while there is widespread 
consensus among the Israeli Supreme Court justices regarding the 
actual adoption of the ripeness doctrine,6 there is disagreement – and 
even confusion7 – regarding the manner of its implementation. In 
this debate among the justices, three notable trends can be pointed 
out: first, emphasizing the need for a cautious approach to the 
adoption of the American doctrine as it stands; second, a reversion to 
first principles in relation to the Court’s duty to decide disputes 
brought before it; and third, the extension of the list of exceptions to 
the principle of the applicability of the ripeness doctrine, with an 
emphasis on the presence of covert discrimination, the existence of 
broad governmental discretion which is missing clear criteria, the 
concern that the fundamental issue at hand will not be referred again 
to the Court for determination, the existence of a serious 
infringement of a constitutional right, and the absence of an 
alternative process for more effectively determining the claims. 
In the legal literature, one may encounter the view that by 
adopting the ripeness doctrine the Court is expressing its reluctance 
to clash with the political authorities, among other things, in light of 
the ongoing political threats and attempts to erode the Court’s 
 
 4 See HCJ 2311/11 Sabah v. Knesset, Nevo Legal Database (2014); HCJ 
3166/14 Gutman v. Att’y Gen., Nevo Legal Database (2015); HCJ 5239/11 Avneri 
v. Knesset, Nevo Legal Database (2015). 
 5 HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at paras. 17, 21 (opinion of Grunis, J.). 
 6 See HCJ 5239/11 Avneri, at para. 1. 
 7 Ariel Bendor, Ripeness and More, 8 MISHPATIM 33, 35 (2016) (“[S]ome of 
the judges agreed with the position of other judges . . . but described the position 
with which they agreed in a manner different to that in which it was presented by 
other judges who espoused it.”). 
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powers.8 In substantive terms, a review of the legal literature shows 
that there are, almost, no legal expositions fundamentally criticizing 
the adoption of the doctrine per se.9 According to Yitzhak Zamir’s 
approach – which, in my humble opinion, is erroneously perceived to 
express principled opposition to the ripeness doctrine – adoption of 
the ripeness doctrine does not offer any benefit given the traditional 
threshold criteria (for example, relating to the petition being 
‘premature’). On the contrary, in his view, the doctrine creates legal 
uncertainty and even makes the legal process more complex.10 I am 
not convinced that Yitzhak Zamir is, in principle, opposed to the 
ripeness doctrine. I understand his argument to be that this doctrine 
does not offer anything novel, but rather forms part of the long-
standing threshold criteria, for example, in the case of a premature 
petition. It seems to me that this argument can, if anything, support 
the ripeness doctrine as forming part of a well-established and well-
known body of law: one that does not change fundamental 
principles. In any case, in contrast to Yitzhak Zamir’s approach, 
Elena Chachko11 confines her critique to the manner in which the 
American doctrine is applied in Israeli law. In her view, the 
substantive application of the American doctrine would actually lead 
the Court to deliberate and decide upon the merits of the 
constitutional questions before it.12 Like Chachko, Ariel Bendor 
criticizes the manner in which the ripeness doctrine is applied in 
Court rulings, while at the same time pointing out the power of the 
Court to expand the scope of judicial review by utilizing the doctrine 
to develop a discourse which relates not only to the constitutionality 
of the law itself but also to the constitutionality of its 
 
 8 See Adam Shinar, Restoring the Former Glory of the High Court’s Threshold 
Criteria – Another Look at the Nakba Case, HATRAKLIN - THOUGHTS ON THE LAW 
(June 1, 2012). Cf. YITZHAK ZAMIR, ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY 1896 (Vol. 3, 
2014); Daphne Barak-Erez, Putting Man at the Center – On Man’s Place in Law, 39 
IYONI MISHPAT 5, 24–25 (2016). 
 9 See Suzie Navot, The Constitutional Dialogue: Dialogue with Institutional Tools, 
12 MISHPATIM 99, 121–124 (2018) (I wrote “almost” because Suzie Navot raised 
several contemplations in regard to the compatibility of the American doctrine to 
the Israeli legal system.). 
 10 ZAMIR, supra note 8, at 1896–897. 
 11 Elena Chachko, On Ripeness and Constitutionality, 43 MISHPATIM 419, 419 
(2012). 
 12 Id. at 451. 
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implementation.13 In this article, I would like to present a principled 
position that opposes the adoption of the American ripeness doctrine 
in Israeli constitutional law. The critical approach presented here is 
based on an analytical-critical examination of the circumstances that 
have led Israeli constitutional law to adopt the American doctrine. 
This position, which expands on the criticisms already presented by 
scholars, rests on four main arguments: 
First, no methodology whatsoever has been employed when 
incorporating the American ripeness doctrine into Israeli 
constitutional law. Notwithstanding that a number of judges have 
referred to the need to exercise particular caution with regard to the 
manner of adopting the American doctrine as it stands, in fact the 
doctrine has been adopted intact. In my view, therefore, there is no 
basis to the argument that the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style” is 
indeed “Israel style.” In addition, although some judges have been 
clear about the institutional and normative differences between the 
American legal system and the Israeli legal system, at the end of the 
day, the Court has never truly examined the ramifications of these 
differences for the application of American doctrine in Israeli law. 
Moreover, it would seem that it is the constitutional differences 
between the two legal systems, referred to by the Court, which 
indeed support the view that the ripeness doctrine is foreign to Israeli 
law and that its adoption is both contrived and artificial. 
Second, the objectives underlying the ripeness doctrine, as 
presented by the Court, even if worthy and correct in themselves, do 
not compel the incorporation of the American doctrine into Israeli 
law. This is because the incorporation of the doctrine has not 
resulted in any real saving in judicial time or improved efficiency. On 
the contrary, the rulings dealing with the ripeness doctrine are spread 
over hundreds of pages, and include long, complex, and even 
cumbersome legal opinions. In addition, the Israeli constitutional 
tradition contains more than enough traditional threshold criteria that 
provide a proper response to classic cases of premature petitions, for 
example, where there are adequate alternative remedies or the 
petitioner has failed to exhaust prior proceedings. Moreover, the 
 
 13 Bendor, supra note 7, at 51. 
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‘respect clause’ which, pursuant to Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
Liberty that underpins the constitutional revolution,14 requires every 
governmental authority to respect the rights under that Basic Law, is 
binding on all government authorities, including the legislature. 
Further, it is the Court’s duty to hear and decide constitutional 
questions relating to alleged infringements of fundamental rights, 
including, in particular, infringements ostensibly committed by the 
legislature. Additionally, the principle of the separation of powers – 
in its substantive sense, as a mechanism for checks and balances and 
mutual supervision of governmental authorities – actually demands 
that the ripeness doctrine be rejected. While public trust in the 
professionalism, fairness, and neutrality of the judiciary is a factor 
which may properly be considered, public trust in the sense of 
avoiding publicized clashes with the political authorities is a 
consideration which is both extraneous and invalid. 
Third, the adoption of the ripeness doctrine in Israeli law, 
including its development in terms of scope and application, is 
ambiguous, replete with inconsistencies, and creates legal uncertainty. 
On the one hand, in the absence of a concrete factual foundation, the 
Court has rejected constitutional petitions even when these involve 
important legal questions. On the other hand, in other cases, even 
when a detailed factual foundation has been demonstrated, the Court 
has dismissed the petitions in limine, this time on the ground that it is 
necessary to demonstrate the existence of a cumulative practice of 
infringement of a fundamental right. In addition, one may identify a 
gross inconsistency regarding the existence of an alternative 
procedure as an exception to the applicability of the ripeness 
doctrine. In one case, even though an alternative procedure existed, 
the Court nonetheless refrained from applying the ripeness doctrine 
out of concern that the fundamental issue would not be referred to it 
for consideration again. In another case, even in the absence of such 
an alternative proceeding, and despite the anticipated damage from 
failing to consider and decide the constitutional issue on the merits, 
the Court still clung to the ripeness doctrine, while declaring that it 
was concerned with a fait accompli, albeit one which was temporary 
 
 14 CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Vill., 49(4) 
PD 221, 307–08, 313, 411–12, 458 (1995) (Isr.) 
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(temporary injury over a sustained period). Moreover, even 
substantively, an examination of all the legal cases concerning the 
ripeness doctrine clearly demonstrates inconsistencies regarding the 
manner of application of the doctrine, including the exceptions 
thereto. For example, in one case, the Court restricted itself to an 
analysis of the law, attaching no relevance to the psychoanalysis of 
the legislature, while in another case, the intent of some of the 
legislators was considered to have acute legal significance for the 
application of the ripeness doctrine. Finally, the legal uncertainty 
enveloping the manner in which the ripeness doctrine is being 
developed and implemented increases when judges are required to 
apply the common sense test. Such a process could lead two judges, 
possessing common sense, and hearing the same case to reach two 
opposing legal conclusions concerning the applicability, or at least the 
scope and manner of implementation of the doctrine. 
Fourth, it seems that the incorporation of the ripeness 
doctrine into Israeli law is motivated by the judiciary’s desire to avoid 
conflict with the political authorities, including principally the 
legislature, particularly in light of ongoing political threats to curtail 
the Court’s powers. Emphasizing this is the fact that the cases 
applying the ripeness doctrine, as explained in this article, dealt with 
issues that are at the core of social, political and ideological rifts in 
Israeli society. However, it also seems that while the ripeness doctrine 
is presented as a tool for self-restraint applied by the judiciary, it is, in 
reality, designed in such a way as to leave the absolute discretion as to 
its actual application, scope and manner of implementation to the 
Court itself. In many cases, even though the Court chose to dismiss 
petitions in limine on the grounds of the ripeness doctrine, its rulings 
still contained detailed instructions, directed at the executive branch, 
as to how the latter should interpret the statutory provisions under 
consideration in such a way as to avoid the violation of fundamental 
rights in the future. In my view, the adoption of the ripeness doctrine 
in Israeli law expresses a form of judicial diplomacy; it is in the nature 
of tactical judicial review that creates an indirect constitutional 
dialogue with the legislative authority, through the executive branch. 
This judicial diplomacy is possible precisely because of the 
parliamentary characteristics of Israeli democracy, where the 
members of the executive branch are, for the most part, also 
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members of the legislature. In my opinion, this trend is extremely 
worrying, and may impair both the independence and the equilibrium 
of Israel’s judiciary, not least by blurring the institutional boundaries 
between the legislature and the executive branch. 
Therefore, in the second section, I will review the first four 
legal cases in the framework of which the ripeness doctrine took its 
initial steps toward Israeli constitutional law. In the third section, I 
will present the three main legal cases in which the “ripeness 
doctrine, Israel style” was shaped. In the fourth, fifth and sixth 
sections, respectively, I will discuss critically: the question of the 
methodology of using comparative law as a tool for importing legal 
doctrines; the purposes underlying the ripeness doctrine; and the 
ambiguity, inconsistency, and legal uncertainty involved in the 
adoption and application of the ripeness doctrine in Court rulings. 
Finally, in the seventh section, I will discuss the implications of 
adopting the ripeness doctrine for the institution of judicial review. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN RIPENESS DOCTRINE IN 
ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
At the heart of the ripeness doctrine, as enshrined in Israeli 
constitutional law, is the precept that when a constitutional question 
arises, and in the absence of a concrete set of facts, the judicial 
decision on the substantive question must be deferred to a later date. 
The doctrine took its first steps in the context of four legal cases 
which essentially developed, shaped, and supported the purposes 
underlying the doctrine, namely: first, regulation of the stream of 
referrals and other matters submitted to the Court; second, saving 
judicial time and increasing efficiency; third, dealing with the 
possibility that, over time, the need to decide the fundamental issue at 
hand would be obviated; and fourth, enhancing public confidence in 
the judiciary by confining judicial intervention to cases involving a 
concrete dispute. I shall consider each of these four cases, in the 
order in which they were decided. 
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A. The Disengagement Case 
At the beginning of 2006, the High Court of Justice dismissed 
in limine a petition against the constitutionality of two provisions 
enshrined in the Disengagement Plan Implementation Law.15 These 
two provisions essentially impose a criminal penalty (six months 
imprisonment) and economic sanctions (denial of compensation) on 
Israeli residents of the evacuated communities in the Gaza Strip and 
northern Samaria if they reside or return for the purpose of residing 
in the evacuated area after the evacuation date set by the Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Defense. The ground for the dismissal 
of the petition was the threshold criterion concerning the existence 
of an effective alternative remedy provided by the Disengagement 
Implementation Law. According to the Court, first, it was possible to 
examine the constitutionality of the criminal sanction in the context 
of the criminal process as such, in the event that one was pursued; 
second, it was possible to raise claims against the economic sanction 
before the eligibility committees as well as before the special 
committees, if and when such a sanction was applied.16 However, in 
her separate judgment, Justice Miriam Naor added – notably, in an 
individual opinion – an additional ground for dismissing the petition 
outright: one rooted in the ripeness doctrine, which was borrowed 
entirely from American law.17 According to Justice Naor, the crux of 
the ripeness doctrine is that, in the absence of a concrete, clear and 
complete set of facts, which are necessary for the purpose of forming 
a principled judicial decision, the Court will not consider the petition 
itself. This, as a tool to regulate the stream of referrals and other 
matters submitted to the Court, is a tool capable of deferring judicial 
decisions but not necessarily preventing them.18 In her view, the 
 
 15 HCJ 7190/05 Lobel, at paras. 3–8 (opinion of Naor, J.); see also 
Disengagement Plan Implementation Law, 5775 – 2005 (Isr.). 
 16 See HCJ 7190/05 Lobel, at paras. 11–14 (opinion of Barak, J.) (Decisions 
of the eligibility committees may be appealed as of right to the Magistrate’s Court 
in Jerusalem, and subsequently appealed as of right to the District Court of 
Jerusalem. These committees’ decisions may be appealed as of right to the 
Administrative Affairs Court in Jerusalem, and subsequently, also as of right, to the 
Supreme Court.). 
 17 Id. at para. 3 (opinion of Naor, J.); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 334–335 (Foundation, 3rd ed. 2000). 
 18 HCJ 7190/05 Lobel, at paras. 5, 7. 
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ripeness doctrine is not intended to replace other threshold criteria, 
such as the existence of adequate alternative remedies or failure to 
exhaust proceedings, but to supplement them. Thus, petitioning for 
an alternative remedy or exhaustion of proceedings may, in fact, 
themselves produce the ripeness required for an informed judicial 
decision on the constitutional question.19 
B. The Nakba Case 
About six years after the Disengagement case, Justice Miriam 
Naor (with whom Justice Dorit Beinisch and Justice Eliezer Rivlin 
concurred) dismissed a petition against the constitutionality of a 
provision in the Budget Foundations Law, authorizing the Minister 
of Finance to reduce the budget of a budgeted or financially 
supported body where, among other things, it is found that the body 
has issued a publication that in essence denies the existence of the 
State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state or marks the day of 
the establishment of the State as a day of mourning.20 According to 
the Court, notwithstanding the important and fundamental legal 
issues facing the Court,21 it was conceivable that the alleged 
infringement of a protected right might not take place at all given the 
complex mechanism within which the Minister of Finance was 
required to act.22 According to Justice Miriam Naor, it was also 
possible that, over time, a fundamental decision on the important 
issues raised by the petition would become otiose, either because the 
Minister of Finance would decide not to exercise the authority vested 
in him, or because he might decide to use that authority in a manner 
that did not harm the petitioners.23 In terms of the qualifications to 
the application of the ripeness doctrine, Justice Miriam Naor added 
that if it was proven that waiting until the petition ripened would 
 
 19 Id. at paras. 7–8. 
 20 HCJ 3429/11 Alumni Ass’n; see also Budget Foundations Law 
(Amendment No. 40), 5771–2011 (Isr.). 
 21 HCJ 3429/11 Alumni Ass’n, at para. 28 (opinion of Naor, J.). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at para. 33. I should note that it is not at all clear to me how the 
Minister of Finance can exercise his powers in such a manner that marking the day 
of the establishment of the state as a day of mourning will not compel him to 
exercise his said power, or at least exercise it in such a way as not to harm the 
institutions which are the subject of the power. 
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cause immediate severe harm to the petitioner, then in such a case 
the Court would not abstain from rendering a judicial decision.24 
C. The Securities Case 
About a month after the Nakba case, Justice Eliezer Rivlin 
(with whom Justice Neal Handel and Justice Uzi Vogelman 
concurred) also had cause to consider the ripeness doctrine. This 
occurred in the course of a hearing of petitions against the 
constitutionality of a provision of the Securities Law, which was 
inserted by virtue of the Increased Efficiency of Enforcement 
Procedures in the Securities Authority (Legislative Amendments) 
Law, 5771-2011, which prohibits, in certain circumstances, issuing 
insurance and the existence of indemnification arrangements against 
administrative enforcement proceedings.25 Underlying the petition in 
this case was the argument that this provision infringed the right to 
freedom of occupation as well as the right to equality because the 
imposition of severe financial sanctions, in the absence of the 
employee’s ability to protect himself against such sanctions by 
purchasing insurance, created a chilling effect on the ability to 
function in management positions in companies exposed to sanctions 
of this type including, in particular, those which did not enjoy 
significant economic robustness.26 Relying on the ripeness doctrine, 
the Court dismissed the petition in limine on the ground that the full 
implementation of the arrangements under appeal had not yet 
commenced, and that in any event it was not possible to ascertain the 
extent of the harm which might be caused by the said arrangements 
where implemented.27 According to Justice Eliezer Rivlin, public 
confidence in the judiciary increases when judicial intervention is 
carried out in order to prevent the actual violation of fundamental 
 
 24 Id. at paras. 30–31 (for example, had the Knesset adopted the original 
version of the Day of Independence bill, which contained a criminal sanction of 
three years imprisonment, then in view of the harsh criminal sanction it is 
conceivable that the Court would have decided the petition on the merits even 
before the law was applied in a concrete case); see also United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 
330 U.S. 75 (1947) . 
 25 HCJ 3803/11 Israel Capital Mkt.; see also Securities Law, 5728-1968 (Isr.). 
 26 HCJ 3803/11 Israel Capital Mkt., at para. 5 (opinion of Rivlin, J.). 
 27 Id. at paras. 11–12.  
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rights.28 In his view, protection of public trust in the judiciary is 
essential precisely because the judiciary is the weakest authority 
relative to the other authorities in the state.29 Thus, according to him, 
the Court must preserve its resources, particularly that of public trust, 
for the most essential cases in order to “have them available to it on 
judgment day – to fulfil the role of protecting fundamental rights.”30 
Justice Eliezer Rivlin based this approach on the principle of the 
separation of powers, which requires, in his view, confining the 
Court’s intervention to cases where the disputes are tangible. In other 
words, locus standi is confined solely to those who claim to have 
incurred real harm and immediate and personal suffering.31 Finally, it 
is noteworthy that Justice Uzi Vogelman, in an individual opinion – 
and in light of material differences between American law and Israeli 
law, including in relation to the doctrines of locus standi and 
justiciability – chose to post his own caution, and leave open the 
question of the compatibility of the American ripeness doctrine with 
Israeli law.32 
D. The Tenders Case 
Two years after the decision in the Securities case, Justice Salim 
Jubran, in a minority opinion, dismissed in limine an appeal against an 
administrative petition concerning the constitutionality of a directive 
in the mandatory tender regulations, which deals with the extension 
of the grounds permitting, under certain circumstances, the forfeiture 
of a tender guarantee.33 According to Justice Salim Jubran, even when 
there was a concrete set of facts – such as in the matter at hand – 
there were cases – such as in the matter at hand – where it was 
 
 28 Id. at paras. 18–19.  
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at para. 19. 
 31 Id. at paras. 13, 17. 
 32 Id. (opinion of Vogelman, J.). 
 33 AAA 7201/11 Rahmani, at para. 4 (opinion of Jubran, J.) (helping to 
note that Justice Uri Shoham and Justice Yitzhak Amit chose not to refer, at all, to 
the position taken by Justice Salim Jubran regarding the application and manner of 
implementation of the ripeness doctrine). 
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necessary to demonstrate the existence of a cumulative practice of 
infringement of a protected right.34 
III. THE RIPENESS DOCTRINE, ISRAEL STYLE 
While these four cases were primarily concerned with the 
development of the purposes underlying the ripeness doctrine, in 
three later important legal cases heard by extended panels (nine 
justices), the Court focused on shaping the scope of the doctrine, 
thereby coining the phrase “the ripeness doctrine, Israel style.” At the 
core of the “ripeness doctrine, Israeli-style” is a combined test, 
according to which: in the first stage, the Court examines whether a 
concrete set of facts is needed in order to decide the constitutional 
question on the merits whie, in the second stage, subject to obtaining 
a positive answer in the first stage, the Court will examine the 
existence of other grounds which nevertheless compel it to render a 
judicial decision on the constitutional question. An in-depth 
examination of these three cases reveals that, accompanying the 
broad consensus among the justices regarding the actual adoption of 
the ripeness doctrine, is considerable controversy over its scope. 
Three prominent trends can be pointed out in this disagreement 
among the justices: one, emphasizing the need for caution regarding 
the adoption of the American doctrine as it stands; the second, the 
importance of returning to fundamental principles in relation to the 
Court’s duty to decide disputes brought before it for adjudication; 
and third, extending the exceptions to the applicability of the ripeness 
doctrine, through an emphasis on the presence of covert 
discrimination, the existence of broad governmental discretion which 
lacks clear criteria, the concern that the fundamental issue at hand 
will not be referred again to the Court, the existence of a serious 
infringement of a constitutional right, and the absence of an 
alternative process for more effectively determining the claims. I shall 
 
 34 Id. (helping to argue that the first signs of Justice Salim Jubran’s 
approach can be found – albeit not explicitly stated – in the judgment rendered by 
Justice Eliezer Rivlin in Israel Capital Mkt.; in dismissing the petition in limine, 
Justice Eliezer Rivlin held that the petition did not rely on cases which had actually 
occurred, ones that illustrated the assertions made therein). 
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refer to each of the three cases, in the order in which they were 
decided. 
A. The Admissions Committees Case 
This case concerned a law permitting a communal village to 
make the allocation of land to persons applying to reside in the 
village contingent upon the prior approval of an admissions 
committee, comprised, inter alia, of representatives of that village. 
Among the listed statutory grounds on which an admissions 
committee may reject a candidate’s application to join and reside in a 
communal village, is, inter alia, the candidate’s incompatibility with life 
in the community or with the socio-cultural fabric of the community 
and village.35 At the same time, the law provides a qualification, 
namely, that the admissions committee may not reject candidates 
upon grounds of race, religion, gender, nationality, disability, personal 
status, age, parenting, sexual orientation, country of origin, outlook or 
political-party affiliation.36 
Justice Asher Grunis (with whom Justices Miriam Naor, 
Elyakim Rubinstein, Esther Hayut, and Hanan Melcer concurred) 
dismissed the petitions, stating that at this stage, when the law had 
not yet been implemented, the petitions should be dismissed for lack 
of a sufficient factual basis upon which to decide the questions at 
hand.37 In particular, he reached this conclusion because according to 
the law, decisions of the admissions committees could be appealed to 
appeals committees, and subsequently to the Administrative Affairs 
Court.38 There, in the Administrative Affairs Court, it would be 
possible to raise all the relevant constitutional arguments in order to 
allow a decision to be reached. In addition, Justice Asher Grunis 
emphasized that while he regarded the ripeness doctrine as a 
threshold criterion which joined the list of traditional threshold 
criteria, it was not necessarily a criterion which was distinguishable in 
 
34  HCJ 2311/11 Sabah (opinion of Grunis, J.); see also Neta Ziv, Leave Alone the 
Admission Committees: (Soon) Twenty Years for Kaadan, 35 MEVZAKI HEAROUT PSIKA 1 
(2014). 
34  Id. 
 37 HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at para. 10. 
 38 Id. at para. 23. 
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principle from the threshold criteria for a premature petition, but 
rather a specific instance of such a criterion.39 
On the merits, and alert to the need for caution voiced by 
Justice Uzi Vogelman in the Securities case,40 Justice Asher Grunis also 
emphasized that it was necessary to obtain assistance from the 
experience accumulated in the United States in order to develop the 
ripeness doctrine;41 however, it was vital to develop the “ripeness 
doctrine, Israel style,”42 which at its core was a two-step test: 
In the first stage, the Court must decide whether the 
central question at issue in the petition is a legal one, 
the answer to which does not require a detailed set of 
facts, or whether implementation of the law is 
required in order to answer it. In the second stage, the 
Court is required to consider whether there are 
grounds to hear the petition despite the absence of a 
sufficient factual basis.43 
The first stage did not entail a dichotomous decision as to the 
existence or absence of a concrete set of facts. According to Justice 
Asher Grunis, it was necessary to examine the scope of the factual 
basis required to decide the constitutional questions which were 
posed in each and every case. In his opinion, this was the appropriate 
way to act in cases where the determination of the legal questions 
required a certain set of facts to be present which would assist in 
examining whether there had been a violation of a protected right, 
and additionally, the nature and intensity of the alleged violation. This 
was the case, for example, when one was faced with a statutory 
provision permitting “relatively wide leeway for interpretation on the 
part of the executive branch when implementing the law.”44 The 
 
 39 Id. at para. 11. (in this way, Justice Asher Grunis sought to respond to 
Yitzhak Zamir’s criticism regarding the incorporation of the American ripeness 
doctrine into Israeli law); see also ZAMIR, supra note 8, at 1892–98. 
 40 See HCJ 3803/11 Israel Capital Mkt. 
 41 HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at para. 21 (opinion of Grunis, J.). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at para. 17. 
 44 Id. at para. 15. 
2020 "UFO" 9:1 
17 
latter state of affairs offered a classic case for the application of the 
ripeness doctrine; this was because, prior to the implementation of 
the law by the executive branch, or prior to its implementation to a 
sufficient extent,45 the ramifications of that act could not be 
ascertained. Nonetheless, according to Justice Asher Grunis’ 
approach, when the majority of the question facing the Court was 
fundamentally legal, the “future factual development [would] not 
contribute to the legal decision”, and hence there was scope to 
consider and decide the merits of the constitutional questions in the 
absence of, and perhaps notwithstanding the absence of, a concrete 
set of facts.46 To illustrate this position, Justice Asher Grunis referred 
to legislation which was essentially racist in nature, such as racial 
segregation in schools, which was unconstitutional and where no 
question arose as to its implementation.47 Another example cited by 
Justice Asher Grunis concerned the privatization of prisons, where in 
his view the transfer of powers from the state to private entities 
operating for profit created an inherent violation of constitutional 
rights.48 
In the second stage of the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style”, 
Justice Asher Grunis considered the “chilling effect” – that is, when 
leaving the law unchanged could cause people to refrain from 
engaging in lawful conduct for fear of having the law enforced 
against them – as a case that justified a hearing and determination of 
legal questions in the absence, and perhaps despite the absence of, a 
concrete set of facts.49 According to Justice Asher Grunis, a chilling 
effect could take various forms and occur in various circumstances, 
such as: first, where waiting for the implementation of the law would 
expose the petitioner to a risk, such as a sanction, or compel him to 
 
 45 Id. at para. 12. (showing, to some extent, these remarks adopt the 
position taken by Justice Salim Jubran, as set out in a minority opinion in the case 
of Rahmani DA Earthworks Ltd., according to which it is not sufficient to point to 
a concrete set of facts; there must also be a cumulative practice of harm to the 
protected right). 
 46 HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at para. 12. 
 47 Id.; see also Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 48 HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at para. 12; see also HCJ 2605/05 Acad. Ctr. for 
Law and Bus. v. Minister of Fin., 63(2) PD 545 (2009). 
 49 HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at para. 16 (opinion of Grunis, J.). 
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breach the law; second, it could take the form of concern that the 
petitioner or the public would suffer damage; third, it might be 
concern about the creation of irreversible facts on the ground as a 
result of the deferment of a judicial determination on the legal 
questions; fourth, because of the nature of the issue in dispute, from 
a practical point of view, there potentially might not come a point in 
time at which the petition would be considered ripe, and therefore a 
hearing of that issue could never be held too soon or too late; and 
fifth, where there was a real public interest is determining the 
petition, such as where a serious violation of the rule of law had been 
committed.50 Countering this, Justice Asher Grunis emphasized that 
this second stage of the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style” examined the 
“balance of convenience”51 and that, as a corollary, consideration also 
had to be given to situations where “legal inquiry [could] impair the 
continuity of administrative action or the ability of the executive 
branch to change or amend any policy which it has adopted”.52 
This is the place to note that Justice Elyakim Rubinstein and 
Justice Naor’s concurrence with the judgment rendered by Justice 
Asher Grunis did not reflect their full acquiescence to the “ripeness 
doctrine, Israel style”. First, while Justice Elyakim Rubinstein adopted 
Justice Asher Grunis’ stance regarding the grounds for dismissal of 
the petitions, he did not express a position of principle as to the 
“ripeness doctrine, Israel style”. Moreover, he suggested exercising 
caution when using the concept of the chilling effect, albeit without 
seeking to minimize the value of that idea.53 Despite all this, Justice 
Elyakim Rubinstein stated that the issue of the applicability of the 
ripeness doctrine was a matter of common sense and emphasized 
that this doctrine was not generically different from the threshold 
criteria regarding a premature petition.54 Second, Justice Miriam Naor 
opined that it was better at this stage to develop the ripeness doctrine 
 
 50 Id. at para. 16. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at para. 15 (opinion of Rubinstein, J.). 
 54 Id. at para. 14. 
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“one step at a time” and that once a “sufficient number of cases were 
collected, the Court would be able to formulate an overall picture.”55 
In contrast to Justice Asher Grunis, Justice Salim Jubran 
ruled in a minority opinion (with which Justices Edna Arbel, Yoram 
Danziger, and Neal Handel concurred), that notwithstanding the 
absence of a concrete set of facts, including a cumulative practice, the 
petition was ripe for a constitutional hearing.56 This was the case, in 
his view, due to the existence of covert discrimination, which could 
be learned from the background to the enactment of the amendment 
to the Cooperative Societies Ordinance;57 the wide discretion, and 
absence of clear criteria, granted to the admissions committees;58 and 
the concern that the fundamental issue would not be referred again 
to the Court in light of the offending party’s practice of retracting the 
infringement once judicial proceeding were commenced.59 Underlying 
the result reached by Justice Selim Jubran was his approach to the 
existence of two considerations that had to guide the Court in 
relation to the applicability of the ripeness doctrine: first, the severity 
of the injury that might be inflicted on an individual if the petition 
was not heard;60 and second, the absence of an alternative procedure 
for effectively examining the claims.61 
As for Justice Neal Handel, it should be emphasized that his 
affiliation with the minority camp, in terms of the outcome of the 
judgment, may be misleading.62 For, in relation to the ripeness 
 
 55 Id. at para. 1 (opinion of Naor, J.). 
 56 Id. at paras. 9, 65, 84 (opinion of Jubran, J). 
 57 Id. at para. 9. 
 58 Id. at para. 32. 
 59 Id. at para. 10. 
 60 Id. at para. (opinion of Jubran, J.). 
 61 Id. at para. 7. In this section, Justice Salim Jubran adopted the view of 
Justice Miriam Naor in the Graduates of the Arab Orthodox High School in Haifa, 
supra note 3, at para. 31 (opinion of Naor, J.). 
 62 Justice Neil Handel upheld the petitions, albeit partially, stating that the 
petitions were ripe insofar as they pertained to the question of the composition of 
the admissions committees. In his view, this composition gave a built-in advantage 
to the communal villages as opposed to applicants seeking to join these villages – in 
other words, an advantage that created a real danger of unconscious bias and hence 
a disproportionate infringement of the right to equality. Id. at para. 16 (opinion of 
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doctrine in general and the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style” in 
particular, his views seemed to resemble those of Justice Asher 
Grunis more closely than those of Justice Salim Jubran. Justice Neal 
Handel adopted the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style” as proposed by 
Justice Asher Grunis,63 yet proposed his own partial ripeness doctrine 
under which in those cases where there were constitutional questions, 
some of which were ripe and some of which were not, a decision had 
to be rendered on those questions which were ripe.64 Underlying 
Justice Neal Handel’s position, was the perception that the outcome 
of the application of the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style” did not have 
to be “all or nothing.”65 According to Justice Neal Handel, the partial 
ripeness doctrine was not intended to replace the “ripeness doctrine, 
Israel style” at all; instead, the partial ripeness doctrine formed part of 
the second stage of the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style:” 
When within the framework of the first stage, it is 
concluded that the greater part, including the core, of 
the petition is not ripe for determination due to the 
absence of the concrete infrastructure required in the 
circumstances of the matter, though a certain portion 
of the petition is ripe for decision now – it will still be 
necessary to examine whether grounds exist to split 
the various parts of the petition.66 
 
Handel, J.). In this connection, it should be noted that Justice Miriam Naor 
explicitly considered Justice Neal Handel’s position, and stated that in relation to 
the composition of the admissions committees, Justice Neal Handel’s concerns did 
not establish a need for immediate judicial intervention because the decisions of the 
admissions committees could be appealed to the appeals committees, which was 
comprised of public representatives only – in other words, an objective monitoring 
and control mechanism was available. Id. at para. 3 (opinion of Naor, J.). 
 63 Id. at para. 3 (opinion of Handel, J.).  
 64 Id. Underlying Justice Neil Handel’s approach were three justifications: 
first, it could not be assumed that the complex tests put forward by Justice Grunis 
would always lead to a unified result; second, the partial ripeness doctrine had 
already been recognized for a long time by American law; and third, the partial 
ripeness doctrine stemmed from the objectives of the general ripeness doctrine, 
namely efficiency, public confidence in the judiciary, and the enhancement of the 
judicial determination. Id. at paras. 4-6. 
 65 Id. at para. 2. 
 66 Id. at para. 7. 
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In his view, at this stage, and within the framework of the 
examination of the application of the partial ripeness doctrine, it was 
imperative to determine: first, that the proposed splitting of the legal 
questions was exceptional (and, as a corollary, a special reason was 
required that would justify it; second, that there were considerations 
and tests – in addition to those proposed by Justice Asher Grunis 
within the context of the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style”67 – that 
justified recognition of partial ripeness in a particular case. In this 
regard, the following had to be considered:68 first, to what extent it 
was clear that the specific question under consideration did not 
require concrete implementation in order for a constitutional decision 
to be made in respect of it;69 secondly, the extent to which the 
petition was compatible with the hearing being split, in a manner that 
was neither artificial nor would cause the entire legal edifice to 
collapse;70 third, whether the question was substantive – both 
qualitatively and quantitatively – even if it was not the central or 
dominant question in the petition;71and fourth, whether a hearing 
now of the issue which was ripe for determination would produce a 
benefit that justified the splitting of the petition or obviate future 
damage.72 
B. The Electoral Threshold Case73 
This case was concerned with the constitutionality of raising 
the Knesset electoral threshold from 2% to 3.25%. As in the 
Admissions Committees case, Justice Selim Jubran, in a minority 
 
 67 Id. 
 68 The relationship between the above considerations and tests may be 
reciprocal, “in such manner that the clear existence of one consideration may 
‘atone’ for the weaker existence of another consideration.” Id. at para. 8. 
 69 This consideration is similar to that presented by Justice Asher Grunis, 
and in respect to which he cited the example of the privatization of prisons. Id. at 
para. 12 (opinion of Grunis, J.). 
 70 Id. at para. 8 (opinion of Handel, J). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. We are referring to the American “balance of convenience” test to 
which Justice Asher Grunis referred in his judgment. Id. at para. 18 (opinion of 
Grunis, J.). 
 73 HCJ 3166/14 Gutman; see also The Knesset Elections Law (Amendment 
No. 62), 5774-2014 (Isr.). 
2020 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 9:1 
22 
judgment, faced off against Justice Asher Grunis, albeit this time on 
his own. 
While Justices Asher Grunis and Salim Jubran both held that 
the petitions raised significant questions that touched upon the 
fundamental characteristics of the democratic regime in the State of 
Israel and the electoral system applied there,74 they were divided 
primarily on the question as to whether the time was ripe to discuss 
and decide the constitutional issues raised by the petition. Faithful to 
the two-step test making up the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style,” 
developed by him in the Admissions Committees case,75 Justice Asher 
Grunis concluded that the petitions had to be dismissed as being 
premature. In contrast, Justice Salim Jubran believed that, both 
according to the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style” and according to the 
criteria he himself had established in the Admissions Committees case in 
relation to the severity of the harm which might be caused to the 
individual in the event that the petition was not heard, as well as in 
relation to the existence or absence of an alternative procedure for 
more effectively determining the claims, it would be wrong to dismiss 
the petitions on the grounds of the ripeness doctrine.76 
It is interesting to note that even though the two judges 
supported the application of the American ripeness doctrine in Israel, 
Justice Salim Jubran never explicitly adopted the “ripeness doctrine, 
Israel style” – either in the Admissions Committees case or in the Electoral 
Threshold case. In contrast to Justice Salim Jubran, Justice Asher 
Grunis expressly adopted Justice Salim Jubran’s approach regarding 
the existence of cases where it was not sufficient to demonstrate the 
existence of a concrete factual basis in order to establish that a 
particular petition was ripe for determination but that it was also 
necessary to show a cumulative practice of infringement of a 
protected right.77 
Another point worth emphasizing is that both judges 
favoured the view that the decision as to whether an issue was ripe 
 
 74 Id. at paras. 15, 17 (opinion of Grunis, J.). 
 75 HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at para. 17 (opinion of Grunis, J.). 
 76 HCJ 3166/14 Gutman, at paras. 5-7 (opinion of Jubran, J.). 
 77 HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at para. 12 (opinion of Grunis, J.). 
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for hearing and determination had to be made within the context of 
the first stage of the constitutional review process customarily 
conducted in the Israeli legal system: namely, the stage at which the 
Court considered whether a constitutional right or principle had been 
infringed.78 This was another development of the ripeness doctrine, 
which prima facie provoked a legal debate between the two judges, this 
time concerning the standard of proof required to prove an 
infringement of a constitutional right. Justice Asher Grunis held that 
the petitioners bore the burden of proving a material violation or a 
material infringement of a protected right or a material and patent 
deviation from a constitutional principle.79 In contrast, Justice Salim 
Jubran held that when the expected harm to an individual’s 
constitutional right was of great magnitude and there was no 
alternative procedure for hearing the claims, it was sufficient to 
demonstrate real potential for violation of the right in order to enable 
a hearing of the petition even before the constitutional violation had 
actually occurred.80 I write ‘prima facie’ because Justice Asher Grunis 
presented Justice Salim Jubran’s view as one which favoured in 
principle and in general the test of real potential for violation of a 
right,81 whereas Justice Salim Jubran’s stated position was in fact 
limited only to those cases in which the magnitude of the anticipated 
harm to a constitutional fundamental right of the individual was great 
and there was no alternative procedure for determining the claim.82 
In this debate between Justices Grunis and Salim Jubran, it is 
appropriate to shine a spotlight on another matter upon which they 
disagreed, this time concerning the implications of the application of 
the ripeness doctrine for the case under discussion. While the two 
judges concurred in the view that the outcome of dismissing the 
petitions could lead to a fait accompli, which might justify a decision on 
the merits of the petitions, even in the absence of a concrete factual 
 
 78 HCJ 3166/14 Gutman, at para. 41 (opinion of Grunis, J.); id. at para. 8 
(opinion of Jubran, J.). 
 79 Id. at para. 41 (opinion of Grunis, J.). 
 80 Id. at para. 17 (opinion of Jubran, J.). 
 81 Id. at para. 65 (opinion of Grunis, J.). 
 82 Id. at para. 17 (opinion of Jubran, J.). 
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basis,83 Justice Asher Grunis stated that this was a temporary fait 
accompli, while Justice Salim Jubran took the view it was a permanent 
fait accompli, or at minimum a temporary but prolonged and 
continuous fait accompli.84 In other words, Justice Asher Grunis 
formed a view based on the forthcoming election campaign in 
relation to the date of the hearing on the petitions in the case at hand, 
and as such determined that it was a temporary fait accompli;85 whereas 
Justice Selim Jubran focused on the term of the Knesset (four years), 
and as such determined that it was a permanent fait accompli, or at least 
a temporary but prolonged and continuous fait accompli.86 This 
distinction between temporary harm and permanent harm – or, at 
least, temporary but prolonged and continuous harm – is another 
development of the ripeness doctrine. 
Another interesting albeit not explicit development is 
revealed in Justice Asher Grunis’ judgment. Even though Justice 
Asher Grunis had dismissed the petitions by virtue of the ripeness 
doctrine, he still methodically considered each of the petitioners’ 
arguments, discussed them and decided whether each of the issues 
raised by these claims was premature or not.87 This process is clearly 
reminiscent of the partial ripeness doctrine presented by Justice Neal 
Handel in the Admissions Committees case. 
With regard to the other judges on the bench ruling on these 
petitions, it should be noted that although all, except Justice Salim 
Jubran, concurred with the result reached by Justice Asher Grunis 
regarding the dismissal of the petitions, not all were in agreement 
regarding the path to this outcome. While Justices Hanan Melcer, 
Neal Handel, Yoram Danziger, and Elyakim Rubinstein concurred 
with Justice Asher Grunis’ arguments concerning the ripeness 
doctrine, subject to a number of comments of their own, Justices Uzi 
 
 83 Id. at para. 60 (opinion of Grunis, J.); id. at para. 21 (opinion of Jubran, 
J.). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at para 60 (opinion of Grunis, J.). 
 86 Id. at para 21 (opinion of Jubran, J.). 
 87 Id. at paras. 48-49 (opinion of Grunis, J.). 
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Vogelman and Miriam Naor88 agreed with Justice Salim Jubran that 
the petitions were ripe for hearing and adjudication. However, unlike 
Justice Salim Jubran, they held that the amendment to the Knesset 
Election Law was proportionate, and as a corollary, constitutional. 
Justice Yoram Danziger for his part sought to develop the 
exception to the ripeness doctrine dealing with the existence of a 
chilling effect.89 In his view, the chilling effect was potent precisely in 
those cases where it might create a vicious circle in which it itself 
prevented the establishment of the factual infrastructure.90 In his 
view, a prime example of this was legislation that infringed the right 
to freedom of expression.91 
Reiterating the view, he had expressed in the Admissions 
Committees case, Justice Elyakim Rubinstein again referred to the 
common sense test, from which, among other things, he had derived 
the ripeness doctrine.92 
For his part, to further the caution he had previously voiced 
in relation to the manner of implementation and scope of application 
of the American ripeness doctrine in Israeli law,93 Justice Uzi 
Vogelman again warned that the ripeness doctrine should not be used 
as long as no definitive data was available regarding the constitutional 
questions, as it was not always possible to achieve complete 
 
 88 Like Justices Uzi Vogelman, Miriam Naor, and Salim Jubran, Justice 
Esther Hayut considered that the constitutional questions in the petitions were ripe 
for determination. This was because raising the electoral threshold, irrespective of 
the existence of a factual basis, infringed the principle of equality under Section 4 
of Basic Law: the Knesset. In addition, in her opinion, in order for such an 
infringement to be constitutional, it was not sufficient for the amendment to the 
Knesset Election Law to pass the hurdle of the formal standard, it also had to 
comply with the judicial limitation clause. Like Justices Vogelman and Naor, Justice 
Esther Hayut considered that the amendment met all the conditions of the judicial 
limitation clause. See Gutman, supra note 4, at para. 3 (opinion of Hayut, J.). 
 89 Id. (opinion of Danziger, J.). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at para. 7 (opinion of Rubinstein, J.). 
 93 See the opinions rendered by Justice Vogelman in HCJ 3803/11 Israel 
Capital Mkt. Trs.’Ass’n and HCJ 2311/11 Sabah. 
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certainty.94 In asserting this, Justice Uzi Vogelman referred to first 
principles: namely, that the Court’s function was to decide the 
petitions brought before it and the ripeness doctrine was an 
exception to this rule. These two determinations presented an 
important and critical development of the cautionary note previously 
voiced by Justice Uzi Vogelman in relation to the manner and scope 
of application of the ripeness doctrine. In any event, in substantive 
terms, Justice Uzi Vogelman was of the opinion that the petitions 
were ripe for deliberation and decision, mainly because the case at 
hand was not one in which it was preferable to wait and examine how 
the executive branch would implement the provisions of the law or 
how the lower instance courts would give effect to the various 
provisions.95 On the contrary, if anything, the existence of a chilling 
effect was proven in the Electoral Threshold case, and this was because 
the political actors had already adapted themselves to the new 
normative situation.96 Nonetheless, Justice Uzi Vogelman considered 
that, on the merits, the amendment to the Knesset Election Law met 
the constitutional tests, whether these were formal in nature or 
substantive in character. 
Finally, the judgment of Justice Miriam Naor is particularly 
interesting. On the one hand, in her view, the mere heightening of 
the electoral threshold established a violation of the constitutional 
principle that “every vote has equal weight,” protected under Section 
4 of Basic Law: the Knesset, and consequently there was no need for 
a concrete factual basis in order to decide the petitions on the merits; 
in other words, the ripeness doctrine did not apply.97 On the other 
hand, even though she took the view that the violation was 
proportionate and met the tests of the judicial limitation clause,98 she 
still chose to concur with the concluding segment in Justice Asher 
Grunis’ judgment whereby dismissal of the petitions would not close 
the doors to further examination of the amendment to the Knesset 
Election Law, once the results of the elections to the Twentieth 
 
 94 See HCJ 3166/14 Gutman, at para. 2 (opinion of Vogelman, J.). 
 95 Id. at para. 3 (opinion of Vogelman, J.). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at paras. 1-3 (opinion of Naor, J.). 
 98 Id. at paras. 3-4. In Justice Miriam Naor’s view, in these types of cases, 
the zone of proportionality available to the Knesset was particularly wide. 
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Knesset were known. In her words, “these are matters in respect of 
which trial and error are necessary.”99 This last proposition was one 
with which Justice Uzi Vogelman and Justice Esther Hayut also 
concurred.100 
C. The Boycott Case101 
This case dealt with the constitutionality of the Prevention of 
Damage to the State of Israel through Boycott Law. This law 
imposes liability in tort and various administrative sanctions against 
anyone who knowingly publishes a public call for a boycott of the 
State of Israel, within the meaning of the law. In the above case, three 
sections of the law were subjected to constitutional scrutiny: Section 
2, which deals with the imposition of civil tort liability, including 
Section 2(c) providing for the imposition of damages which are 
independent of the actual damage caused (hereinafter: punitive 
damages); and Sections 3 and 4, which deal with the imposition of 
administrative sanctions. Section 3 also confers authority on the 
Minister of Finance, with the consent of the Minister of Justice and 
with the approval of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of 
the Knesset, to promulgate regulations for the implementation of 
these sanctions.102 The term “boycott of the State of Israel” is defined 
in Section 1 of this Law as “deliberately avoiding economic, cultural or 
academic ties with another person or body solely because of their affinity with the 
State of Israel, one of its institutions or an area under its control, in such a way 
that may cause economic, cultural, or academic damage.”103 
Reading the plethora of opinions presented in the judgment, 
and insofar as concerns the question of the application of the 
ripeness doctrine, Ariel Bendor rightly wrote that: 
 
 99 Id. at para. 7. 
 100 Id. at para. 6 (opinion of Vogelman, J.); id. at para. 4 (opinion of Hayut, 
J.). 
 101 HCJ 5239/11 Avneri v. Knesset; see also The Prevention of Damage to 
the State of Israel through Boycott Law, 5771 – 2011. 
 102 Id. 
 103 The Prevention of Damage to the State of Israel through Boycott Law, 
supra note 101, § 1. 
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It is difficult to understand the opinions of some of the 
judges [ . . . ] This difficulty stems from the fact that some of the 
judges agreed with the views of other judges in this regard, but 
described the position with which they concurred in a different 
manner from that presented by other judges who advocated it.104 
Ariel Bendor precisely described the ambiguity surrounding 
the ripeness doctrine as expressed in the various opinions rendered 
by the judges: 
Three justices (President (Ret.) Grunis and Justices Melcer 
and Amit) opined that in the future, based on concrete facts, 
constitutional arguments could be raised against all four sections; two 
justices (President Naor and Vice President Rubinstein) opined that it 
would be impossible to raise constitutional arguments against any of 
the sections (as opposed to arguments concerning the manner of 
implementation of the law or the content of regulations or rules 
promulgated thereunder), and apparently three other justices (Justices 
Handel, Danziger and Vogelman), based on various substantive 
analyses, left no opening for future constitutional reviews, beyond the 
determinations in the Avneri judgment regarding the validity of 
sections of the Boycott Law, while one justice (Justice Jubran) took 
the view that in the future constitutional claims could be raised 
against Sections 3 and 4.” (Emphasis in the original).105 
Ariel Bendor argued that ultimately, the only consensus 
reached by all the judges revolved around the unconstitutionality, 
including the invalidity, of Section 2(c) of the Boycott Prevention 
Law relating to punitive damages, as well as the dismissal of the 
petitions insofar as they concerned Sections 3 and 4 of the law 
regarding administrative sanctions. On the other hand, opinions were 
divided relating to Sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the law.106 The 
fragmentation of the ripeness doctrine, as described here, indicates, 
even if only prima facie the adoption of Justice Neal Handel’s 
approach regarding the partial ripeness doctrine, as expressed in the 
Admissions Committees case. 
 
 104 Bendor, supra note 7. 
 105 Id. at 49. 
 106 Id. 
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After studying the various opinions in this case, it seems to 
me that there are four points which should be emphasized. First, in 
contrast to Justice Yoram Danziger, Justice Elyakim Rubinstein held 
that it was insufficient to demonstrate a chilling effect in order to 
bring about the application of the ripeness doctrine, for the relevant 
question was one of the intensity of the chilling effect.107 Second, in 
his judgment, Justice Yoram Danziger adopted the approach taken by 
Justice Salim Jubran in the Tenders case, as reiterated by Justice Asher 
Grunis in the Admissions Committees case, to the effect that there are 
cases where it is not sufficient to demonstrate a concrete factual 
basis, but it is also necessary to point to a cumulative practice of 
infringement of a protected right.108 Third, Justice Yitzhak Amit 
adopted Justice Miriam Naor’s approach, as expressed in the Nakba 
case, regarding the possibility that, at the end of the day, the Minister 
of Finance will not exercise his authority. Fourth, Justice Yoram 
Danziger adopted and emphasized the goal of public confidence, 
which Justice Eliezer Rivlin pointed to in the Securities case.109 
IV. THE RIPENESS DOCTRINE, ISRAEL STYLE: QUESTIONS ABOUT ITS 
USE IN COMPARATIVE LAW 
Appealing to comparative law in order to import legal 
doctrines is a proper and worthy process. This is especially true when 
dealing with constitutional law, which concerns constitutional issues 
that are common to a wide range of states. Accordingly, an appeal to 
comparative law may provide a judge deliberating a case with a 
wealth of legal ideas, which ultimately assist him in deciding the 
concrete issues before him.110 However, there is a gap, and properly 
so, between the judge’s free academic ability to contemplate and 
ponder legal theories and doctrines existing in comparative law and 
his institutional and normative ability to adopt such doctrines intact, 
within the framework of the local law in which he operates. 
Institutionally, comparative law is not binding law in a foreign legal 
system, so at most it may serve as a source of inspiration only for the 
 
 107 HCJ 5239/11 Avneri, at para. 14 (opinion of Rubinstein, J.). 
 108 Id. at para. 49 (opinion of Danziger, J.). 
 109 Id. 
 110 AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 290-291 (2004). 
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judge who aspires to enrich his legal knowledge of shared legal issues. 
Normatively, various legal systems are usually characterized by 
substantive normative differences which require careful scrutiny prior 
to the adoption of any legal doctrine. Moreover, the adoption of a 
legal doctrine also requires adjustments to domestic law. In my view, 
unlike the vertical relationship between international law and 
domestic law, the relationship between comparative laws is 
horizontal. In other words, one comparative law may serve as the 
amicus curiae for another comparative law. Furthermore, an 
examination of comparative law in relation to domestic law is not 
much different from an examination of philosophical legal theories in 
abstract terms. By this, I am seeking to say that not every theory, 
however efficacious it may be, can justifiably be applied in every legal 
system. 
A. There Is Nothing New Under The Sun 
When examining the manner in which the American ripeness 
doctrine has been adopted and incorporated into Israeli law, the 
warning signs to which I referred above, did not go unnoticed by the 
Supreme Court justices. Notably, Justice Uzi Vogelman stressed the 
need to reflect on the concept of introducing the American doctrine 
intact into Israeli constitutional law, in light of the differences 
between the respective characteristics of Israeli constitutional law and 
American constitutional law. Like Justice Uzi Vogelman, Justice 
Esther Hayut, in the Admissions Committees case,111 pointed out two 
main points of distinction between the American legal system and the 
Israeli legal system. First, the American ripeness doctrine is based on 
a provision enshrined in the United States Constitution under which 
the Court must avoid adjudicating abstract disputes devoid of any 
real issues in contention, whereas the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style” 
stems from the self-restraint which the Court may choose to impose 
upon itself when exercising its powers under Sections 15(c) and 15(d) 
of Basic Law: the Judiciary. Second, the implementation of threshold 
criteria in Israeli law is more flexible.112 Nonetheless, the Supreme 
 
 111 HCJ 5744/16 Ben Meir v. The Knesset, Nevo Legal Database (2018). 
 112 Id. 
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Court has never engaged in a thorough examination of the two legal 
systems. 
At the same time, a considerable discrepancy is evident 
between the rhetoric of Justices Uzi Vogelman and Esther Hayut on 
the one hand and the actual implementation of the doctrine on the 
other. I would emphasize that the terminology coined by Justice 
Asher Grunis in the Sabah case: “the ripeness doctrine, Israel style” 
does not confer a genuinely Israeli character on the doctrine, with its 
dual components, and in any event does not reflect a substantive 
legal examination of the differences between the two legal systems 
and their implications for the ripeness doctrine’s application in Israeli 
law, as described by Justice Esther Hayut. Indeed, “the ripeness 
doctrine, Israel style” is strikingly similar to the American formula, as 
accurately presented by Elena Chachko in an article that was 
published immediately after the Nakba case and the Tenders case, and, 
as mentioned, prior to the Sabah case. In examining the extent to 
which the ripeness doctrine conforms to constitutional law in Israel, 
Elena Chachko traces the origins of the ripeness doctrine in 
American law. In her view, the American ripeness doctrine – which 
the Supreme Court in Israel sought to adopt, at least at the outset113 – 
includes “substantive tests designed to assess the law on its merits, 
which sometimes allow a decision ‘on the face of the law,’even before 
it is implemented.”114 According to Elena Chachko, the United States’ 
test for the applicability of the ripeness doctrine is two-fold: first, ripe 
petitions are those where the questions at issue are primarily legal and 
not factual; second, an examination is conducted of the implications 
and various interests attaching to the legal norm under review before 
it is implemented, and the implications of deferring judicial review 
until after it is implemented.115 According to Elena Chachko: 
Even if the result of applying the ripeness doctrine is 
the conclusion that it is premature to hear the 
petition, this does not exclude a hearing on the 
preliminary question as to whether there is room for 
 
 113 In other words, prior to the Admissions Committees case, the Electoral 
Threshold case, and the Boycott case. 
 114 Chachko, supra note 11, at 439, 440-41. 
 115 Id. at 441. 
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judicial review ‘on the face of the law’ because it 
infringes a constitutional right. The question whether 
a law infringes a constitutional right and the question 
of ripeness are therefore two separate questions, 
although they affect one another, and it is appropriate 
for the Court to respond to both before deciding 
whether to defer a determination on the 
constitutionality of the law.116 
We can see, therefore, that the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style,” 
initially in the Sabah case (that is, following the publication of Elena 
Chachko’s article), is not materially different to the American 
doctrine. 
An in-depth examination of Justice Asher Grunis’ judgment 
in the Sabah case provides further support for this assertion. In his 
ruling, Justice Asher Grunis emphasized his agreement with Justice 
Uzi Vogelman’s comment in the Israel Capital Market Trustees 
Association case,117 stating that the American ripeness doctrine should 
not be imported into Israeli law, lock, stock and barrel. However, in 
his view, the experience accumulated in the United States could be 
used to help develop this doctrine in Israeli law.118 Accordingly, 
Justice Asher Grunis sought to develop the “ripeness doctrine, Israel 
style.”119 Yet, a perusal of the entirety of the judgment rendered by 
Justice Asher Grunis, indicates that no “ripeness doctrine, Israel 
style” was in fact developed, and that in essence his doctrine is the 
same as that applied in the United States. Indeed, in response to the 
question of when a petition would be deemed ripe for hearing, Justice 
Asher Grunis referred to the American ripeness doctrine, including 
the dual test as developed by the United States Supreme Court,120 and 
as described above in Elena Chachko’s article. This dual test, as 
espoused by the United States Supreme Court is at the crux of the 
“ripeness doctrine, Israel style.”121 There is no basis, therefore, for 
 
 116 Id. at 448. 
 117 See HCJ 3803/11 Israel Capital Mkt. Trs.’Ass’n v. State of Israel. 
 118 HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at para. 21 (opinion of Grunis, J.). 
 119 Id. at para. 3 (Hayut, J., concurring). 
 120 Id. at para. 21; see also The Abbott, supra note 1. 
 121 Cf. HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at paras. 15-16. 
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asserting that the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style” is an Israeli 
doctrine; rather, it does no more than incorporate the American 
ripeness doctrine lock, stock and barrel into Israeli law.122 
B. The Ripeness Doctrine: Contradicting Unique Trends in Israeli 
Constitutional Law 
The above discussion makes evident the need to understand 
the essential differences between the American legal system and the 
Israeli legal system prior to the incorporation of the ripeness doctrine 
into Israeli law. As noted, Justice Esther Hayut pointed out two main 
differences in this context, which can be addressed as follows. 
With regard to the first issue, one may identify a new test of 
adjudication, according to which the question of a statute’s 
constitutionality is bound up with the question of its implementation. 
This test deviates from the practice of Israeli law in relation to the 
judicial review of statutes, which, for the most part, is applied 
abstractly and without necessarily being tied to concrete 
circumstances.123 
With regard to the second issue, from the 1990s onwards, 
there has been a clear trend towards increased flexibility regarding its 
application, including the scope of application of traditional threshold 
criteria – such as locus standi, good faith and more – in Israeli 
constitutional law.124 This trend continues to this day, and therefore it 
 
 122 It should be noted that, in paras. 19-20, Grunis’ opinion does not 
contain a discussion regarding differences between the American and Israeli legal 
systems concerning the ripeness doctrine, including the extent of its application in 
Israeli constitutional law. The discussion set out by Justice Asher Grunis in these 
two paragraphs relates to his attempt to clarify the general distinction between the 
process of judicial review in Israel and that applied in the United States. Put 
differently, he sought to emphasize that the adoption of the American ripeness 
doctrine into the local system did not constitute the indirect adoption of other 
issues pertaining to the judicial review process in the United States, such as the 
distinction between abstract judicial review and applied judicial review. 
 123 Chachko, supra note 11, at 433-36. 
 124 See, e.g., AMNON RUBINSTEIN & BARAK MEDINA, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL: BASIC PRINCIPLES 177-180 (6th 
ed. 2005); HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Def. 42(2) PD 441 (1988); HCJ 
2148/94 Gelbert v. Hon. President of the Sup. Ct. and Chairman of the Inquiry 
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is unclear why a new threshold criteria must be developed, 
particularly in view of the current judicial trend to reduce the 
application of the threshold criteria, and as a corollary expand the 
right of access to the High Court of Justice. Underlying the factors 
that have led to the reduced use of the traditional threshold criteria – 
such as, judiciability, locus standi, tardiness, and more – are worthy 
considerations, first and foremost among which is the principle of 
the rule of law. Accordingly, and as long as the Court does not intend 
to deviate from this principle, it would seem that the incorporation of 
the ripeness doctrine into Israeli law is artificial and stands in sharp 
contradiction not only to the prevailing trend of using traditional 
threshold criteria for the past two decades, but particularly to the 
principle of the rule of law on which this trend is founded. I shall 
address the latter matter regarding the rule of law with greater vigour 
in the last section of this article. 
In this state of affairs, before the Israeli Supreme Court has 
considered the crucial institutional and normative differences 
between the American and Israeli legal systems insofar as concerns 
the constitutional legal issues pertaining to the ripeness doctrine, it 
seems that the very act of importing it, never mind adopting and 
applying it, is itself problematic. Further, and more substantively, as 
previously demonstrated, in my opinion, the American ripeness 
doctrine is alien to Israeli constitutional law; it inexplicably deviates 
from the constitutional practice applied in Israel to judicial review, 
and it stands in sharp contradiction to the tendency to dampen the 
application of the threshold criteria in Israeli constitutional law. 
C. The Ripeness Doctrine, Israel style – Lost in a Sea of Goals 
An examination of the case law in the context of which the 
ripeness doctrine has developed in Israeli law reveals that this 
 
Committee to Investigate the Massacre in Hebron 48(3) PD 573 (1994); HCJ 
651/03 Ass’n for C.R. in Israel v. Chairman of the Central Election Committee for 
the Sixteenth Knesset 57(2) PD 62 (2003); HCJFH 4110/92 Hess v. Minister of 
Def. 48(2) PD 811; HCJ 852/86 Aloni v. Minister of Just. 41(2) PD 1 (1987); HCJ 
1/81 Sheeran v. Broadcasting Authority 35(3) PD 365 (1999); HCJ 1635/90 
Zarzevski v. The Prime Minister 45(1) PD 749 (1991); HCJ 428/86 Barzilai v. The 
Gov’t of Israel 40(3) PD 505 (1986). 
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development has not only circled around questions concerning the 
manner and extent of the doctrine’s application, but also to its 
purposes. This last issue in turn has had a considerable impact on the 
scope of these developments and the way in which the doctrine has 
been implemented. Patently, the case law concerned does not contain 
an in-depth debate between the judges regarding these underlying 
purposes, either in relation to the actual recognition of them or in 
relation to their scope and the implications of adopting them. 
In the Disengagement case, Justice Miriam Naor, in an 
individual opinion, characterized the purpose of the ripeness doctrine 
as providing a tool for regulating the stream of referrals to the Court. 
Later, in the Nakba case, Justice Miriam Naor – with whom, this time, 
Justices Dorit Beinisch and Eliezer Rivlin concurred – expanded the 
spectrum of goals motivating the ripeness doctrine, and described the 
doctrine as necessary to save judicial time and increase efficiency, out 
of the hope that the statutory provision under review would become 
a dead letter; whether due to the Finance Minister’s choice to refrain 
from exercising his statutory authority or because of the application 
of the clauses in a way that would not harm the petitioners, or for any 
other reason. Following this, in the Securities case, Justice Eliezer 
Rivlin, presiding, sought to broaden the spectrum of purposes 
necessitating the adoption of the ripeness doctrine even further, this 
time in reliance primarily on the principle of the separation of 
powers. In his view, it was necessary to confine judicial intervention 
to cases where the dispute was concrete, as public confidence in the 
Courts was enhanced when judicial intervention was aimed at 
preventing an actual violation of fundamental rights. 
In my opinion, a thorough examination of each of the above 
purposes highlights constitutional and practical difficulties with 
regard to their adoption in connection with the ripeness doctrine. 
Nonetheless, I wish to clarify already that I do not contend that these 
purposes are improper, rather, my argument is that these are 
problematic goals to the declared need to import the American 
ripeness doctrine into Israeli constitutional law. 
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1. Saving Judicial Time And Increasing Efficiency – Indeed? A Tool 
For Regulating The Stream Of Referrals To The Court – How? 
In none of the latter three legal cases in which the ripeness 
doctrine was considered and the petitions dismissed primarily 
because of this doctrine was any judicial time whatsoever saved or 
any financial resources preserved. Each of these cases involved a 
number of hearings and the ensuing judgments covered hundreds of 
pages.125 Furthermore, even when some of the judges relied on the 
ripeness doctrine, they still, for some reason, chose to state their 
position on the merits of the petition itself, in preparation for the 
next petition which might be brought before them once the issues 
matured in the future. 
Therefore, judicial time was not saved, nor efficiency 
increased. On the contrary, considerable precious judicial time was 
invested in the deliberations and decisions on the merits of the 
petitions, which, at least based on the rationale underlying their 
dismissal, was not really necessary. This was because the Court was 
faced with a threshold criterion pursuant to which the decision on 
the petitions could have been deferred, without recourse to the legal 
polemic that was laid out over the hundreds of pages in question. 
Moreover, the detailed constitutional discussion conducted within the 
context of these rulings essentially invited the parties to revert back 
to the Court in the event that the statutes, which were the subject of 
the petitions, were not interpreted or implemented according to the 
standards proposed by the Court itself. 
If the doctrine is indeed concerned with regulating the stream 
of referrals to the Supreme Court, it would seem that Yitzhak Zamir 
was right in arguing that adopting the ripeness doctrine in Israeli law 
has not in fact created any added value or benefit. After all, there are 
already other threshold criteria that support the purposes underlying 
the ripeness doctrine as a threshold criterion per se; for example, the 
 
 125 Nonetheless, one cannot deny the possible argument that while the 
judgments which established the ripeness doctrine in Israel contain lengthy 
discussions – therefore making it doubtful that judicial time was saved or judicial 
resources preserved for vital cases – the principle itself, once formulated, will lead 
to these results in the future, in terms of creating a chilling effect. 
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threshold criteria regarding premature petitions, abstract petitions, 
theoretical petitions, and more. Additionally, according to Yitzhak 
Zamir, damage – or, at least, considerable difficulty – follows from 
the doctrine’s adoption in Israel. Thus, for example, it makes the legal 
process more complex and impairs the certainty and clarity of the 
law, especially in discussing questions relating, to the relationship 
between the ripeness doctrine and the other threshold criteria.126 
2. The Respect Clause And The Hope That The Law Will Become A 
Dead Letter 
From a legal point of view, the Court’s refusal to engage in a 
substantive constitutional hearing, as a result of its aspiration, or 
perhaps hope, that over time the need to decide the fundamental 
issue would be obviated – whether due to the decision of the 
Minister Finance not to exercise his authority under the law, or by 
reason of the statutes’ implementation in such a manner as not to 
harm the petitioners, or for some other reason – is very problematic, 
and even contradicts the ‘respect clause’ in Basic Law: Human 
Dignity and Liberty. First, this position reflects the view that no 
distinction should be made between judicial review of a statute’s 
constitutionality, on the one hand, and constitutional review of the 
manner of its application, on the other.127 Second, it sends the 
ostensible message that, unlike the executive branch, the legislature is 
not subject to the constitutional criteria of the limitation clause.128 In 
this last context, it is worth recalling the basic tenet posited by Justice 
Uzi Vogelman, whereby it is the Court’s function to decide petitions 
coming before it, inter alia, by virtue of the ‘respect clause’ in Section 
11 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which states that “each 
 
 126 ZAMIR, supra note 8, at 1896-97. It should be noted that Itzkak Zamir 
did not completely negate the very existence of the ripeness doctrine; his criticism 
was focused on its existence in Israeli law. In the Admissions Committees case, Justice 
Asher Grunis stated, without elaborating further, that the ripeness doctrine is a 
private instance of a threshold criteria regarding premature petitions. What does it 
mean: “a private instance of another threshold criteria?” What are the similarities or 
differences between the general threshold criteria regarding premature petitions and 
the concrete instance of the ripeness doctrine? 
 127 Bendor, supra note 7, at 49. 
 128 Id. at 52-53. 
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and every government authority is bound to respect the rights under 
this Basic Law.” 
In terms of judicial review of the legislature, it is noteworthy 
that in the Mizrahi Bank case,129 the Court emphasized the substantive 
status of the ‘respect clause,’ outlined the scope of its application to 
the legislature, and listed the criteria for its applicability in accordance 
with the limitation clause. In the Mizrahi Bank case, the Court itself 
relied on the ‘respect clause’ to explain: first, the legislature’s duty to 
respect protected rights; and second, the judiciary’s duty to respect 
protected rights by preventing other governmental authorities, 
including the legislature, from violating these rights otherwise in 
accordance with the limitation clause. 
As to the legislature’s duty to respect protected rights, I 
believe that the adoption of the ripeness doctrine is at odds with the 
‘respect clause,’ both in relation to the exercise or non-exercise of 
judicial review of the legislature, and in relation to the nature of the 
Court’s authority to exercise judicial review. In my opinion, the 
manner in which the legislature is bound to respect protected rights is 
by enacting laws in accordance with the criteria outlined in the 
limitation clause. In my view, the legislature violates a protected right 
by the process of enacting laws that restrict protected rights, for 
example, through criminal, civil, or administrative law. In such cases, 
the question is, as noted, whether or not this legislation meets the 
conditions of the limitation clause. Further, the ‘respect clause’ does 
not make the legislature’s duty to respect protected rights conditional 
upon the intensity of the injury, or the existence of a tangible injury, 
or the existence of a cumulative practice of injury, nor in any event 
does it make it contingent upon the manner in which the responsible 
Minister chooses to implement the law. With all due respect, it seems 
to me that in relation to the ripeness doctrine, the discussion held by 
the Court, as described above, is very problematic. For example, in 
the Nakba case, it appears that while the petition was directed at the 
legislature and the constitutionality of the statutes enacted by it, the 
Court actually chose to divert the spotlight on to the arena of the 
 
 129 See CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Vill., 
Nevo Legal Database (1995). 
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executive branch and examine the constitutionality of the exercise of 
its powers as these had been conferred through Knesset legislation. 
In that case, Justice Miriam Naor did not explain, at any point, how 
the ripeness doctrine was compatible, for example, with the ‘respect 
clause.’130 The question faced by the Court in that case was one of the 
constitutionality of the Minister of Finance’s authority to cancel the 
budgets, inter alia, of institutions that marked the day of the 
establishment of the State of Israel as a day of mourning. This may 
be a constitutional question of the first importance concerning the 
freedom of expression of budgeted institutions, but has no relevance 
to the question of the actual or manner of exercise of the Minister of 
Finance’s authority. 
As to the duty of the judiciary to respect protected rights by 
preventing other government authorities, including the legislature, 
from violating these rights otherwise than in accordance with the 
limitation clause, it is evident that the respect clause is also of vital 
importance to the judiciary itself. The power of the Supreme Court to 
exercise judicial review over the legislature is not really a discretionary 
power. In fact, the “respect clause” imposes a duty on the Court to 
respect the protected rights. When the Court refrains from exercising 
judicial review over any of the government authorities, it infringes 
protected rights, even if it is not refusing to exercise judicial review 
but merely delaying it. Ultimately: 
This Court is not concerned with the ‘battle for 
control’ but with imposing the supremacy of the rule 
of law and the subordination of all state authorities to 
the law.131 
 
 130 § 11, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, SH 5752 (1992) (Isr.); see 
also Judith Karp, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – A Biography of Power Struggles, 
1(2) MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 323, 373 (1993) (even then, Karp pointed out that the 
expression “government authority” should be interpreted as also including the 
legislative authority). 
 131 HCJ 5364/94 Velner v. Chairman of the Israeli Labor Party 49(1) PD 
758, 809 (1995). 
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3. The Principle Of The Separation Of Powers And Enhanced Public 
Confidence In The Judiciary 
In any event, I am not certain upon what foundation the 
Court has based its assumption that if it were to confine its review of 
the legislative authority – as opposed to the executive branch – to 
cases where the dispute is concrete, that this would lead to increased 
public confidence in the judiciary. This assumption is purely 
speculative. Indeed, where the judiciary enjoys the public’s trust, this 
is certainly welcome. However, the jurisdiction of the Court should 
be exercised in accordance with a clear and precise compass that 
guides it in the discharge of its duty under the “respect clause” and in 
accordance with its authority under Section 15(c) of Basic Law: The 
Judiciary. The Court’s jurisdiction cannot be exercised in accordance 
with an arbitrary standard which at best may be likened to a kite 
blown by political winds in the public sphere. In my opinion, the 
Supreme Court was right in the past when it came out against the 
idea of feedback in respect of judicial performance, and it would do 
well to leave the issue of public confidence, in the sense presented by 
the Court, outside the bounds of legitimate judicial policy 
considerations. Be that as it may, it can easily be seen that the 
judiciary enjoys a higher degree of public confidence than the other 
government authorities, even in the post-Mizrahi Bank case era, 
including the constitutional revolution before it. To all this, one must 
add that, at the end of the day, all sectors of the population in Israel – 
right, left, and centre; Jews and Arabs; secular and religious and more 
– find refuge in the Supreme Court, and are able to obtain legal relief 
against the legislative and executive authorities whenever they believe 
that they have been harmed by the activities of these authorities. 
Moreover, there is no evidence whatsoever that the public’s 
confidence in the Court has increased due to the rejection of the 
above petitions by virtue of the ripeness doctrine. In fact, I am not at 
all certain that the public is even aware of the legal issues which 
underlay the petitions discussed here, or the ensuing determinations 
or ramifications of the petitions’ dismissal. 
By this I do not mean to say that no importance should be 
attached to the principle of the separation of powers, nor that we 
should ignore the interest in augmenting public trust in the judiciary; 
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however, a more fundamental understanding of this principle and 
interest requires a different conclusion to be drawn than that reached 
by the Supreme Court on the ripeness doctrine. 
Indeed, at its core, the legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s 
authority to examine the constitutionality of statutes is drawn from 
the fulfilment of the constitutional principle of the separation of 
powers, but this is true in the substantive sense; that is, in the sense 
of checks and balances, and not necessarily in the sense of reducing 
friction in the interrelations between the judiciary and the 
legislature.132 
As for the public trust in the judiciary, certainly the most 
important commodity in the judge’s arsenal is the public’s trust. 
Without public trust, the judge cannot judge. He, the judge, holds 
neither a sword nor a wallet. All he has is the public’s confidence in 
him. This is an asset which the judge must guard with all his might.133 
However, public trust in this context means that the public’s belief 
that the judge is rendering justice on the face of the law, and not the 
public’s conviction that the judge is refraining from clashing with the 
legislature. In the words of Aharon Barak, the need to ensure public 
trust in the judiciary does not mean the need to ensure popularity.134 
Either way, protecting minority rights is by definition unpopular 
because it serves the minority, occasionally at the expense of the 
majority. However, in a democratic regime, the Court must ensure 
that minority rights are not violated, especially when the legislature is 
unable to provide that guarantee in a system based on majority rule in 
the most formal sense. 
 
 132 See RUBINSTEIN& MEDINA, supra note 115, at 127-28. 
 133 AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 292-93 (Papyrus 1987); HCJ 
73/85 Kach Faction v. The Knesset Speaker 39(3) PD 141, 158 (1985); HCJ 
306/81 Platto-Sharon v. Knesset Committee 35(4) PD 118, 158 (1981); HCJ 
5364/94 Velner, at 788. 
 134 BARAK, supra note 124, at 292. 
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V. THE RIPENESS DOCTRINE, ISRAEL STYLE: AMBIGUITY, 
INCONSISTENCY, AND LEGAL UNCERTAINTY 
Even if I was willing to accept the principle of the ripeness 
doctrine, which I am not, the tests offered in the case law, and 
especially the mode of their application, remain problematic, vague, 
and a source of legal uncertainty. The following examples illustrate 
this claim. 
A. A Concrete Factual Basis Versus A Cumulative Practice Of 
Infringement Of A Right 
In one place, the Court held that in the absence of a concrete 
set of facts the petition would not be ripe for constitutional 
examination;135 however, Justice Salim Jubran added in the Tenders 
case that even when there was such a set of facts, a proven practice 
of infringement of the relevant right would also be required.136 This 
was a position with which Justice Asher Grunis later concurred in the 
Admissions Committees case.137 In other words, according to this 
approach, even when there is a proven violation of a constitutional 
right, one which has occurred in a clear factual context, still, in the 
absence of a proven practice of such violations, the Court will refrain 
from deciding the fundamental constitutional question. It is not at all 
clear on what theoretical juridical basis the Court has taken this 
position. Moreover, this legal position could prejudice a petitioner, 
ignore his complaint, and, even worse, use him as a tool and as a 
means of achieving an extraneous objective – namely, the purposes 
underlying the ripeness doctrine.138 
 
 135 See for instance, HCJ 7190/05 Lobel. 
 136 AAA 7201/11 Rahmani. 
 137 HCJ 2311/11 Sabah, at para. 12 (opinion of Grunis, J.). 
 138 This state of affairs raises numerous important questions regarding the 
proportionality of the ripeness doctrine; however, these questions exceed the scope 
of this article. 
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B. The Existence Of An Alternative Process? Depends On Which 
Case! 
In the Electoral Threshold case, Justice Salim Jubran ruled that 
the existence of an alternative process for conducting a more 
effective examination of the claims could have implications for the 
issue of the applicability of the ripeness doctrine.139 However, this 
consideration had not guided him in the earlier Tenders case, where, 
apparently no alternative procedure was actually available. The Tenders 
case was heard as an appeal against an administrative petition; that is 
to say, that was the alternative procedure per se. Still, Justice Selim 
Jubran chose to take a minority viewpoint, adopting the ripeness 
doctrine wholeheartedly and, moreover, expanding the scope of its 
application.140 Similarly, the consideration regarding the existence of 
an alternative process was disregarded by Justice Salim Jubran in the 
Admissions Committees case. There, if Justice Salim Jubran had been 
compelled to consider the issue of the existence of an alternative 
process, he most probably would have concurred with the majority 
opinion and dismissed the petitions against the Admissions 
Committees Law. This is because, according to the statutory 
provisions in the Admissions Committees case, an alternative process 
had been put in place to hear claims, including the possibility of 
attacking the decisions of the admissions committees and the appeal 
committees above them, before the Administrative Affairs Court, and 
from there to the Supreme Court – whether by right or by leave of 
the Court – in accordance with the substantive legal issues involved. 
Moreover, according to the provisions of Section 6 of the 
Administrative Affairs Courts Law, 5760-2000: 
Where an Administrative Affairs Court finds, upon 
the application of a party, the Attorney General, or at 
its own initiative, that an administrative petition 
before it raises a matter of particular importance, 
sensitivity or urgency, it may, after receiving the 
parties’ response, order the transfer of the hearing on 
 
 139 HCJ 3166/14 Gutman. 
 140 AAA 7201/11 Rahmani. 
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the petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High 
Court of Justice. 
It follows that Justice Salim Jubran’s concern that the fundamental 
matter in dispute would not come before him again was completely 
unfounded. Moreover, one may legitimately wonder whether this last 
concern is one that the Supreme Court may properly assert as a 
justifiable legal reason for judicial intervention when alternative 
judicial proceedings can be pursued before other courts, which are 
also empowered to hear the fundamental arguments that form the 
subject-matter of the legal proceedings.141 
Either way, the interesting point is that the Court’s discussion 
of the existence of an alternative process was not at all 
comprehensive. The Disengagement case, for example, points to the 
existence of an alternative procedure for arguing against the 
constitutionality of the penal provision under that law. However, 
Justice Miriam Naor did not examine the outcome and ramifications 
of a direct assault as opposed to an indirect assault on the statutory 
provision. Further, under the legal position currently prevailing in 
Israel, trial courts have the power to exercise constitutional review of 
statutory provisions during the course of hearing the concrete case 
before them, in reality the trial courts in Israel are not eager to engage 
in a constitutional discussion of the constitutionality of any particular 
statutory provision. This is true generally, and even more so with 
regard to penal provisions. 
C. Ripeness? It Depends On Whom You Ask And In What Case! 
In the first phase of the two-stage examination in the Sabah 
case, Justice Asher Grunis was required to consider the Prison 
Privatization case as an example of a situation in which the Court 
could determine that the major portion of the question raised by the 
petition was fundamentally legal and therefore future factual 
developments would not contribute to the judicial decision. At the 
 
 141 I wish to emphasize that the position I have stated above should not be 
taken to mean that I do not agree with the legal outcome reached by Justice Salim 
Jubran in the Admissions Committees case; however, it is not the question of the 
existence of the alternative remedy which guides me in this analysis. 
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same time, Justice Asher Grunis did not explain how the Prison 
Privatization case differed, if at all, from the Admissions Committees case 
or the Electoral Threshold case.142 This is particularly so in light of 
Justice Asher Grunis’ remarks in the Admissions Committees case that 
the relevant statute regarding the privatization of prisons had not yet 
been implemented and that the risks pointed to by the petitioners 
were merely in the nature of a possibility, as well as that the statute 
contained various defense mechanisms for the protection of 
prisoners’ rights and the supervision of these prisons.143 It should be 
emphasized that, in his remarks, this case was cited as an example of 
a situation in which any future implementation of the statute could 
still raise the constitutional question that needed to be discussed; and 
therefore, the question of implementation was irrelevant.144 He did 
this in order to obviate the need to address the position taken by 
Justice Edmund Levy, who held in the Prison Privatization case that 
since the statute had not yet been implemented, the time was not yet 
ripe to decide its constitutionality, and in the picturesque language of 
Justice Edmund Levy: 
As judicial review cannot rely on a loose assessment, 
my position is that it should be left until the proper 
time, and that is not the point in time at which we are 
today. We are therefore dealing with an egg that has 
not yet hatched. Whether it be a good day upon 
which it comes into the world or not, whether it be 
edible or not, we do not yet know.145 
Further, in the second phase of the two-stage examination in the 
Admissions Committees case, Justice Asher Grunis outlined the reasons 
for the chilling effect of the statute, fear that the deferral of judicial 
review would lead to irreversible facts on the ground, or the existence 
of a significant public interest in hearing the petition even before the 
implementation of the statute. This is the place to ask: was the 
Boycott Law incapable of leading to a chilling effect? Once the 
 
 142 HCJ 2311/11 Sabah. 
 143 See HCJ 2605/05 The Academic Center for Law and Business v. The 
Minister of Finance, 63(2) PD 545. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at para. 11 (opinion of Levy, J.). 
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petitions against raising the electoral threshold were dismissed, did 
this not create irreversible facts on the ground? And, was there no 
clear significant public interest in examining the constitutionality of 
the Nakba Law and the Admissions Committees Law?! 
Additionally, while in the Disengagement case the ripeness 
doctrine was applied in “all its glory” despite the existence of a 
criminal sanction (six months imprisonment),146 in the Nakba case, 
Justice Miriam Naor noted that had the Independence Day bill been 
passed, which also included a criminal sanction (three years 
imprisonment), it was likely that the Court would not have given 
consideration to the ripeness doctrine.147 It is not clear, therefore, 
whether it is the very existence of the criminal sanction which 
determines the question of the applicability or inapplicability of the 
ripeness doctrine, or the severity of the sanction. And, if it is the 
latter, it is not clear that a six-month sentence is not a harsh 
punishment! Generally speaking, it is likely that in both cases the 
person subject to the criminal sanctions is of normative character, for 
whom a prison sentence is potentially devastating, whether it be 
imprisonment behind lock and key or merely a sentence carried out 
through community service. Either way, in my opinion, the criminal 
conviction, and accompanying stigma, is so severe that they require a 
substantive constitutional hearing irrespective of the issue of the 
actual punishment meted out. 
Moreover, in the Electoral Threshold case, not only did Justice 
Asher Grunis seek to decide the issue in contention using the two-
stage test of the “ripeness doctrine, Israel style,” which he had 
presented in the Admissions Committees case, but after holding that the 
petitions did not meet the first stage of the doctrine, he for some 
reason did not consider (or even partially consider) the second stage 
of the test. In the second stage, Justice Asher Grunis was supposed 
to examine a number of possible justifications for deciding the 
petitions on the merits, despite the absence of a factual basis. Among 
these justifications, Justice Asher Grunis himself had already 
mentioned in the Admissions Committees case the fear that the deferral 
 
 146 HCJ 7190/05 Lobel. 
 147 HCJ 3429/11 Alumni Ass’n. 
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of the judicial review would lead to the creation of irreversible facts 
on the ground. Except that this hurdle was, apparently, swiftly met, 
through his assertion that it was a temporary fait accompli! Temporary? 
How?! 
Another example may be seen in the positions taken by 
Justices Uzi Vogelman, Miriam Naor, and Esther Hayut in the 
Electoral Threshold case, where they held that raising the electoral 
threshold per se established a violation of the principle of electoral 
proportionality, as protected in Section 4 of Basic Law: the Knesset. 
This, as mentioned, was prior to considering the question of the 
limitation clause. However, none of them wondered in relation to the 
Admissions Committees case, whether the very empowerment of the 
admissions committees to reject applicants by their incompatibility 
with the fabric of life in any particular communal village, was capable 
of establishing a violation of the constitutional right to equality – be it 
proportionate or disproportionate. 
D. Between The Psychoanalysis Of The Legislature And The 
Analysis Of The Law 
A further demonstration of judicial uncertainty may be found 
in the Admissions Committees case, in which Justice Elyakim Rubinstein 
expressly disapproved the practice of referring to statements made by 
those who had initiated or advocated the legislative amendment 
concerning the charge of hidden bias, finding support in Justice 
Aharon Barak’s remark that, at the end of the day, we are concerned 
with “an analysis of the law and not the psychoanalysis of the 
legislature.”148 Yet, suddenly, in the Electoral Threshold case, Justice 
Elyakim Rubinstein did in fact turn to legislative psychoanalysis when 
he referred to all of the Knesset’s records to hold that it was clear 
that some of those who had initiated the amendment genuinely 
believed that the faulty state governance could be improved by means 
 
 148 HCJ 246/81 Agudat Derech Eretz v. Broadcasting Authority 35(4) PD 
1, 17 (1981). This remark was also cited by Justice Asher Grunis. See HCJ 3166/14 
Gutman, at para. 26 (opinion of Grunis, J.). 
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of enacting the amendment and concomitant increase of the electoral 
threshold.149 
E. ON RIPENESS AND COMMON SENSE 
In both the Admissions Committees case and the Electoral 
Threshold case, Justice Elyakim Rubinstein presented the common 
sense test for deciding whether to adopt the ripeness doctrine, 
including the extent and manner of such adoption. Nonetheless, it is 
unclear what Justice Elyakim Rubinstein meant when he referred to 
the common-sense test, nor did he explain how it should be applied 
in practice. In other words, what were the criteria for applying this 
test? Was it an objective or a subjective test? How could he explain 
the fact that some judges were not of the opinion that the petitions 
were still premature for constitutional determination? Could each and 
every judge exercise a different type of common sense to that of his 
colleagues? 
These five examples illustrate the assertion that the adoption 
of the ripeness doctrine, and its implementation in the case law, has 
created uncertainty, a lack of uniformity and, certainly, undermined 
public confidence. Further, the purposes of the doctrine have not 
been realized in practice, and there are alternative legal instruments 
for achieving these purposes. 
E. Instead of a Conclusion: Judicial Diplomacy 
Legal scholars are unanimous in their view that the reason 
underlying the adoption of the ripeness doctrine in Israeli 
constitutional law is the judiciary’s desire to avoid friction with the 
legislature.150 This is particularly true of petitions dealing with divisive 
social, ideological, and policy issues.151 This position is consistent 
with Justice Rivlin’s remarks that judicial review of the legislature 
should be confined solely to cases where there is a genuine dispute – 
a move that would inevitably lead to an increase in public confidence 
in the judiciary. 
 
 149 HCJ 3166/14 Gutman, at para. B (opinion of Rubinstein, J.). 
 150 Barak-Erez, supra note 8. 
 151 ZAMIR, supra note 8, at 1896. 
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It seems, therefore, that when the ripeness doctrine was 
adopted, the Court took a number of huge steps backwards, 
retreating into the era preceding the Mizrahi Bank case, when judicial 
review was confined to the executive branch. Is this really true? The 
answer is: not necessarily. In his book, The Judge in a Democracy, 
Aharon Barak wrote: “Activism or self-restraint are relevant concepts 
only when there is judicial discretion.”152 And in terms of judicial 
discretion, it should be noted that the power to shape it – particularly 
in the absence of explicit (or basic) legislation – is confined 
exclusively to the Court itself. In my opinion, Dr. Adam Shinar 
rightly argues that despite the adoption of the ripeness doctrine, the 
Supreme Court has not yet abandoned norlimited the trend towards 
expanding the traditional threshold criteria, particularly those relating 
to locus standi and justiciability. In Dr. Adam Shinar’s view, largely in 
response to Yitzhak Zamir, the reason why the Court has actually 
chosen to apply the ripeness doctrine rather than the traditional 
threshold criteria, such as locus standi, is the advantage found in using 
the ripeness doctrine, which allows the Court to dismiss petitions on 
an individual basis in light of the factual circumstances of the case 
before it, without such dismissal fettering the Court in the future.153 
Taking a similar approach to Adam Shinar, Ariel Bendor has, 
in his writings, identified a number of advantages to be gained from 
incorporating the ripeness doctrine into Israeli law. In his view, 
through the use of the ripeness doctrine, the Court can expand the 
scope of judicial review by developing a discourse that relates not 
only to a statute’s constitutionality but also to the constitutionality of 
its implementation and, concomitantly, expand the constitutional 
restrictions on laws.154 Ariel Bendor illustrates this last issue by citing 
the Electoral Threshold case and the Boycott case.155 
In another article, Ariel Bendor and Tal Sela argue that the 
expansion of judicial discretion is not only reflected in the adoption 
of the ripeness principle, but also in the choice of whether or not to 
implement it. In other words, there may be instances where the Court 
 
 152 BARAK, supra note 102, at 390. 
 153 Shinar, supra note 8. 
 154 Bendor, supra note 7, at 51. 
 155 Id. 
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will be ready to hear a petition on the merits even if it is still 
premature.156 
For myself, I would like to portray the incorporation of the 
ripeness doctrine into Israeli constitutional law as a form of judicial 
diplomacy in the sense of tactical judicial review, which creates, 
through the executive branch, an indirect constitutional dialogue with 
the legislature.157 This judicial diplomacy is possible precisely because 
of the parliamentary characteristics of Israeli democracy, according to 
which the members of the executive branch are, for the most part, 
also legislative members. In other words, in light of the fact that, in 
terms of personalities, most legislative members are also members of 
the executive branch, it is sufficient to transmit critical messages to 
members of the executive branch and thereby avoid undesirable 
friction with the legislature. Either way, at the end of the day, the 
final decision as to whether to intervene when examining the 
constitutionality of a statutory provision – and if so, in what way – 
remains in the hands of the Court itself; if it so wishes, the petition 
will be considered ripe; if it decides otherwise, it will be deemed 
premature; and, if it so wishes, the Court will hear and decide the 
petition even if it is premature, in accordance with the varied 
exceptions the Court has developed for itself. 
This judicial diplomacy is the direct result of the continuing 
threats emanating from the political authorities which oppose the 
Court’s decisions and untiringly seek to weaken it.158 This state of 
affairs is extremely dangerous, both because it blurs the boundaries 
between the legislative and the executive branches, including in 
judicial review, and because the Court may lose its equilibrium due to 
its attempts to survive the political threats that seek to erode its 
 
 156 See also Ariel Bendor & Tal Sela, Judicial Discretion: The Third Era, 46 
MISHPATIM 605, 630-32 (2018). Ariel Bendor and Tal Sela argue that “the 
expansion of judicial discretion is not reflected solely in the adoption of the 
ripeness ruling but also in the choice whether to implement it.” Id. In other words, 
there may be cases where the Court will hear the petition on the merits even if it is 
premature. 
 
138 See also Navot, supra note 9, at 123-25; Ronen Poliak, Relative Ripeness: Implement or 
Abstract Constitutional Judicial Review, 37 MISHPAT 45, 62-63 (2014). 
 158 Shinar, supra note 8. 
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powers. This is especially true when we are concerned with the 
protection of the substantive democratic-constitutional-
characteristics of the State of Israel. 
F. Epilogue 
Particularly in the past decade, a public-legal discourse was 
conducted in the State of Israel regarding the interrelations between 
the central government authorities; the judiciary on the one hand and 
the legislative and executive branches on the other hand. This 
discourse is being conducted against the backdrop of the tension that 
is influenced by claims of judicial activism, assertions of legislative 
activism, and misgivings about activism in privatization. This tension 
is rooted in a competition between the separation of powers in its 
formal sense, i.e. complete separation of government authority, and in 
the substantive sense, i.e. creation of relations based on mutual 
oversight and checks and balances between these authorities. In 
addition, this tension flourishes in the light of two polar-opposite 
perceptions concerning the principle of the rule of law: at one end, 
demanding adherence to the rule of primary legislation, however 
unjust and unfair it may be; and, at the other end, demanding the 
subjugation of the positive law to the basic values and principles that 
guarantee a degree of fairness and justice for everyone, and 
particularly for those who are unable to obtain such justice from the 
legislative authority itself. 
This tension has existed since the founding of the State of 
Israel, but has intensified – and become more prominent – following 
the enactment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and, 
particularly, following the publication of the judgment in the Mizrachi 
Bank case, when the Basic Laws were granted supra-statutory 
constitutional status. 
This tension does not trouble me. On the contrary, its 
existence is actually a confirmation of the health of Israeli society. 
However, the scope, extent, and manner of managing this tension are 
the issues which provide justifiable cause for anxiety, and all of these 
together predict the worst for the country’s future. In any healthy 
society that seeks to eradicate elements of tyranny and governmental 
corruption, it is imperative that there be tension between those 
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responsible for the legal system and the politicians. This tension is 
the result of the inherent difference in the nature of the interests of 
each of the governmental authorities. Nonetheless, even when this 
type of tension is experienced, it should be constructive rather than 
destructive, reasonable rather than arbitrary, and proportionate rather 
than extreme. A positive discourse can only take place where society 
adopts a steady, solid, repertory of values and fundamental principles 
that guide all governmental authorities in a similar manner, 
irrespective of the narrow considerations and interests of each of 
these authorities. 
In recent years, however, we have witnessed legislative 
activism, evidence apparently of the parliamentarians. Moreover, 
even the executive branch suffers from activism in privatization, for 
example, by way of indifferently privatizing essential services which 
become the object of narrow business considerations. These last two 
phenomena are manifestations of a worrying governmental 
perception prioritizing the removal of fetters from the exercise of 
governmental authority, precisely because the members of these 
governmental authorities are representatives of the people (so it is 
claimed) that they are free to legislate whatever they see fit or manage 
state matters as they deem proper. 
This perception is fundamentally mistaken. It is no more than 
a narrow formal understanding of the concept of democracy. The 
political authorities have apparently forgotten the words of 
Montesquieu, whereby: 
Political liberty is to be found only in moderate 
governments . . . but constant experience shews us 
that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it 
. . . To prevent this abuse, it is necessary, from the 
very nature of things, power should be a check to 
power.”159 
The rule of law in its substantive sense is therefore concerned with 
the desire for governmental acts to fulfil certain basic requirements. 
 
 159 CHARLES LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE 
SPIRIT OF LAWS 197 (T. Evans 1777). 
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These are requirements designed to guarantee the internal morality of 
the law, which is vital to ensure that the public feels a commitment to 
the law and complies with its provisions out of a recognition of its 
binding validity. Adherence to these principles is intended to enable 
the law to fulfill its purpose as a social institution, the goal of which is 
to enable collaborative human existence, increase the public’s sense 
of security and protect individual freedoms. Respect for the rule of 
law is a prerequisite for ensuring the legitimacy of law enforcement 
among members of the public subordinate to the law.160 In this 
context, I am not referring to the term “law” in its narrow sense 
(Gesetz, in German; loi, in French; ley, in Spanish; and law, in English), 
but in the broad sense, which can even be equated with “justice:” law 
which is mandatory, not because it has been enacted in a proper 
formal process by a lawfully elected legislature, but precisely because 
it is just and correct (Recht, in German; droit, in French; derecho, in 
Spanish; and law, in English).161 
It follows, therefore, that the rule of law, in its formal sense, 
is the rule of law enacted in a lawful form by a lawfully elected 
legislature that can fulfill its role as a legislature. In contrast, the rule 
of substantive law is the rule of just and proper law. At the heart of 
these concepts is the distinction between formal democracy and 
substantive democracy. While formal democracy is solely interested 
in the majority opinion and seeks to enforce its decisions, be they 
good or bad, substantive democracy respects the majority’s opinion 
while concurrently protecting the minorities within it (the weaker 
groups), particularly where the majority seeks to misuse its rights in 
its capacity as the majority, in order to oppress those weaker groups. 
Elsewhere, I wrote: 
The Athenian state had a constitution and a supreme 
court. Neither Socrates nor Plato critized democracy 
as such. Socrates was inciting the aristocratic young 
men of Athens to revolt against the democracy of 
Athens, namely, against the rule of the majority. This 
 
 160 RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 115, at 284-85. 
 161 See MOHAMMED S. WATTAD, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL LAW: THREE 
TENETS ON AMERICAN & COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 124-125 (VDM Verlag 2007). 
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is what captured Plato’s mind in offering The Republic, 
the challenge of providing a true definition of justice, 
a philosophy of just and good society; for him, 
democracy is the rule of Law, namely, the rule of 
Good and Justice . . . While formal democracy is the 
rule of the majority, constitutional democracy 
considers the voice of the majority as another factor 
in determining what is fair and just, thus preventing 
any likelihood of abuse of minority rights (those 
whose interests are not protected by the majority). 
Formal democracy acts in accordance with the rule of 
the legislature, no matter how right, decent, just, and 
fair the legislature might be; what the legislature says 
the law is becomes binding law. Constitutional 
democracy scrutinizes the legislature’s actions for 
their compatibility with the fundamental principles of 
fairness, reason, justice, and good. Finally, formal 
democracy represents the rule of law, but 
constitutional democracy is driven by the rule of 
[L]aw. As Plato once argued against formal 
democracy, those who belong to the majority are 
concerned only with their own immediate pleasure 
and gratification, and therefore a democracy that 
relies on the rule of the majority cannot produce good 
human beings.162 
The rule of law is one of the fundamental principles of the legal 
system making up its core substantive elements, shaping the content 
and interpretation of the legal norm and sometimes even determining 
its validity. These fundamental principles are superior to primary 
legislation.163 This approach also expresses the perception that the 
Constitution itself is not always supreme, and it is subject to these 
fundamental principles.164 In this regard Justice Aharon Barak’s 
words are apt: 
 
 162 Id. at 196-98. 
 163 See HCJ 1/65 Yardur v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee 
for the Sixth Knesset 19(3) PD 365, 389 (1965). 
 164 See SHMUEL SAADIA & LIAV ORGAD, REFERENDUM 123 (2000). 
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As a matter of jurisprudential principle, it is possible 
that the Court in a democratic society could declare 
the voidance of a law which is contrary to the basic 
principles of the system; even if these basic principles 
are not enshrined in a rigid constitution or an 
entrenched Basic Law, there is nothing axiomatic 
about the approach that a law is not voided because 
of its content. The voidance of a law by the Court 
because of its severe violation of basic principles does 
not violate the principle of legislative sovereignty, 
since sovereignty is always limited.165 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide on the legality 
of laws. This is pursuant to its constitutional and supra-legal power 
enshrined in Section 15(c) of Basic Law: the Judiciary, and, in 
particular, following the judicial rulings in the Mizrahi Bank case,166 as 
well to its earlier rulings.167 The process of examining the legality of 
laws is essentially interpretative in nature, where the task of 
interpretation is one of the main judiciary powers.168 
The Supreme Court’s power to interpret statutes, Basic Laws, 
regulations and other legal norms is undisputed. When the Supreme 
Court interprets a statute in light of a Basic Law, and a conflict is 
revealed between the Basic Law and the statute in question, that 
contradiction in essence is the interpretation of the laws in 
question.169 
The ruling in the Mizrahi Bank case further strengthened the 
Supreme Court’s status in relation to its power to examine, not only 
 
 165 HCJ 142/89 La’Or Movement – One Heart and One Spirit v. Central 
Elections Committee for the Sixth Knesset 44(3) PD 529, 555 (1990). 
 166 See CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Vill. 
(1995). 
 167 Cf. RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 115, at 182; HCJ 246/81 Agudat 
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Ins. Company et al. v. Minister of Finance et al., 48(5) PD 441 (1994). 
 168 See RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 115, at 151-63; EITAN INBAR, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS REFLECTED IN JUDICIAL RULINGS 84 (2001). 
 169 INBAR, supra note 149, at 89. 
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the statutes’ legality, but also their constitutionality. The crux of this 
latter power is the fulfillment of the Court’s role in maintaining the 
rule of law.170 This is because the primary function of the Supreme 
Court is to instil democratic values in society and enforce the rule of 
law, particularly on the government authorities, where it is the 
legitimacy of the Constitution and the Basic Laws which legitimizes 
judicial review. 
Moreover, in essence, the legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s 
power to review the constitutionality of statutes is derived from the 
constitutional principle of the separation of powers, in its substantive 
sense; that is to say, in the sense of checks and balances.171 This is 
true a fortiori in light of the fact that the Basic Laws, in particular after 
the judicial decision in the Mizrahi Bank case, have attained supra-
constitutional normative status. In that case, clear rules were laid 
down that relate not only to the normative status of the Basic Laws, 
but also to the normative mechanism involved in their operation, 
including changes to and the infringement of rights protected under 
them, as well as the examination of the nature of Basic Laws which 
are formally entrenched and others which are substantively 
entrenched. 
Holding this position, I have no wish to ignore the rationale 
underlying the approach taken by Justice Eliezer Rivlin towards 
public trust: a rationale that emphasizes the status of the judiciary as 
devoid of a wallet and a sword. Indeed, one could argue that the 
judiciary might appropriately possess its own wallet and sword, but in 
their absence, it would not be right to overturn that public trust. 
However, public trust in the judiciary means: 
Trust in judicial professionalism, judicial fairness and 
judicial neutrality which is the public’s confidence in 
the moral character of the judge. It is public trust that 
judges are not parties to the legal struggle, and that it 
is not for their power that they struggle, but for the 
protection of the Constitution and its values . . . 
 
 170 RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 115, at 265-311. 
 171 See id. at 127-128; see also, e.g., HCJ 73/85 Kach Faction, at 158; HCJ 
306/81 Platto-Sharon, at 158; HCJ 5364/94 Velner, at para. 788. 
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Public trust means giving expression to history rather 
than hysteria.172 
VI. SO IT IS, AND NOTHING MORE! 
In conclusion, given the ripeness doctrine, I wonder whether 
the judgment rendered in the Mizrahi Bank case would have seen the 
light of day had the case not come before the Court today. I fear not. 
“Fear,” I write, because I regard the constitutional revolution brought 
about by the Mizrahi Bank case as a blessing “fear,” I write, because I 
consider the ripeness doctrine to pose a danger. Am I right? Only 
time will tell. So, this fruit is left to ripen, and with time it will 
become evident whether it is edible or not, which I hope it will not. 
In the meantime, it is appropriate to note that a court which, 
concurrent with its function of safeguarding justice, has to concern 
itself with rebuffing political assaults and protecting its very existence 
from attempts to weaken it – and the ripeness doctrine reflects such 
an attempt – and may lose its equilibrium. At this time, the Supreme 
Court has not yet lost its equilibrium, but there is no guarantee that 
this risk will not materialize. At the end of the day, we are all 
vulnerable human beings, flesh and blood, either we remain 
“ordinary” people or we become worthy of being judges. 
 
 172 Barak, supra note 102, at 50-51; see also CrimFH 5567/00 Deri v. State of 
Israel 54(3) PD 614, 601 (2000). 
